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THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTOR STATE
DISPUTES AND CHINA: NEW
DEVELOPMENTS ON ICSID JURISDICTION
Jane Y. Willems*
INTRODUCTION
The ICSID Convention of 19651 created the International Centre
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) as an arm of the
World Bank. ICSID offers a venue for the resolution of legal disputes
between foreign investors and host states, providing an alternative to
the courts or administrative tribunals of the host state. 2 As of May 5,
2011, 157 states had signed the Convention and 147 States had
deposited their instruments of ratification.3 China signed the ICSID
Convention on February 9, 1990, ratified it on July 1, 1992 and
deposited its instruments of ratification on January 7, 1993.4 The ICSID
Convention entered into force for China on February 6, 1993. 5
ICSID originally heard contract based investment disputes
between foreign investors and host states. In the 1990s, the ICSID
experienced a multiplier effect in new arbitration filings. ICSID’s
growth in arbitration cases is due to the emergence and dramatic

*
Jane Y. Willems is a Visiting Fellow at the City University of Hong
Kong, School of Law. Ms. Willems is a French Avocat and a Member of the
Bar of California.
1
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States (1965); See International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID Convention, regulations and Rules,
ICSID/15/Rev.1 (2003), 7-22, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf.
2
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 570 (John H.
Jackson ed., 2d ed. 2008).
3
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, List of
Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention, as of May 5, 2011,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&ac
tionVal=ShowDocument&language=English (noting that Russia, Brazil,
Mexico, and Canada (signed by notified) are not contracting states).
4
Id. at 1.
5
Id.
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increase of treaty based investment disputes between foreign investors
and host states.6
The surge of these type of cases in the last fifteen years 7 has
been made possible by the availability of numerous new treaty
instruments,8 and Bi-lateral Investment Treaties (BITs) created by
states offering foreign investors access to international arbitration
against the host state with jurisdiction in ICSID. The growth of ICSID
arbitration filings also coincided with the many crises suffered in many
countries in the 1990s and early 2000s (e.g., Argentina’s, Russia’s,
Ecuador’s, and Venezuela’s financial crises). The use of the investorstate dispute resolution clauses in BITs by foreign investors to claim
compensation before international arbitrators has given rise to a new
type of international arbitration and has been seen as a revolution in
international arbitration practice.
China is among the countries that have signed the largest
number of BITs.9 BITs are intended to encourage foreign investment
in a host country by promising to protect the legal rights of the foreign
investor. The treaties therefore ordinarily contain both substantive and
procedural protections to induce investors to make investments in
foreign countries.
China began to execute BITs in the early 1980s, when it was
changing its economic policy to encourage foreign direct investment in
China. Chinese BITs of that era define the objectives of the

6

“The first investment treaty case, Asian Agricultural Products Ltd.
(AAPL) v. Sri Lanka, was registered in 1987(23 non-investment treaty cases
had been registered at ICSID prior to AAPL).” LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO
ICSID ARBITRATION 6-7 (2d ed. 2011).
7
“As of June 30, 2011, ICSID had registered 351 cases under the ICSID
Convention and Additional Facility Rules” out of which 313 cases filed since
1997. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID
Caseload-Statistics, Issue 2011-2, p. 7, available at www.icsid.worldbank.org
/ICSID/Index.jsp.
8
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development reported almost
2,500 international investment agreements at the end of 2005. See UNCTAD
The Entry into Force of Bilateral Investment treaties (BITs), IIA MONITOR
No.
3
(2006),
UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2006/9,
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiia20069_en.pdf.
9
There are currently 127 Chinese BITs, a complete list is available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_china.pdf, and copies of
each BIT available at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____
779.aspx.
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Contracting Parties broadly, for example, a “desir[e] to develop
economic cooperation between the two Contracting Parties.” 10
Investment law on expropriation has been developing rapidly
through decisions by international arbitral tribunals. The terms of
different treaties have been interpreted in resolving actual disputes
between investors and host states. Even though China has executed
BITs since 1982, there has been no interpretation of the terms of a
Chinese BIT in an investment arbitration case made against China by a
foreign investor.
China’s early BITs contained language relating to investment
arbitration jurisdiction for matters related to expropriation which
China’s negotiators and scholars considered limited arbitral jurisdiction
to one subset of jurisdictional issues---the amount of compensation
which should be paid to the investor if a local court determined there
had been an unlawful expropriation by China. China’s early model
BIT language in the consent to arbitration clause (hereinafter “consent
clause”) read: “[disputes] involving the amount of compensation for
expropriation.”11 China believed, like many Communist countries, that
no foreign arbitral tribunal should have authority to judge the public
necessity of its determinations of the ownership of property within
China.
Therefore, it was ironic that the first investment treaty arbitration
where Chinese BIT terms on jurisdiction were examined was on a
claim by a Chinese investor in Peru who invoked the China-Peru BIT
(1994)12 to claim damages for expropriation by Peru. 13 Mr. Tza Yap
10

Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China
and the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union on the Reciprocal Promotion
and Protection of Investments done at Brussels on June 4, 1984, entered into
force Oct. 5, 1986, 1938 U.N.T.S.305 (“Belgian/Luxembourg-China BIT”),
preamble.
11
CHINESE MODEL BIT, reprinted in WENHUA SHAN & NORA
GALLAGHER, CHINESE INVESTMENT TREATIES, POLICIES AND PRACTICE, app. 4
(Loukas Mistelis series Editor, Oxford Int’l Arb. Series, 2009).
12
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Peru and the
Government of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments done at Beijing on June 9, 1994,
entered into force Feb. 1, 1995, 1901 U.N.T.S. 257 (“Peru-China BIT”), art.
1(2)(a).
13
Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence (Feb. 12, 2007), summary available
at http://www.italaw.com/documents/ TzaYapShumAwardIACLSummary.pdf.
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Shum invested in a Peruvian fishmeal plant to make food products for
export to Asia.14 Mr. Tza claimed that in 2004, the Peru tax authority
investigated his business and levied liens on the firm’s bank accounts
that “ended up destroying [Tza’s] business operations and economic
viability.”15 This, he claimed, amounted to “indirect expropriation.” 16
Peru requested that the ICSID arbitral tribunal bifurcate the
proceedings and decide first whether the tribunal had jurisdiction over
Mr. Tza’s claim.17 This article examines the decision of the Tza
tribunal on jurisdiction.18 In addition this article will focus on several
important concepts that the arbitrators relied upon in determining, over
Peru’s objection, that they were properly seized of jurisdiction taking
into account the correct interpretation of multiple terms in the ChinaPeru BIT (1994). These include language relating to “nationality,” to
the scope of the language of the consent clause, to the so-called “fork in
the road” clause and to the “most favored nation” (MFN) clause.
In particular, this article compares the ratio adopted in Tza to
interpret the Chinese BIT language consent clause to five arbitral
decisions by other investment arbitral tribunals on similar language and
similar jurisdictional problems raised by the often ambiguous language
used in BITs.19
These six decisions were written and filed
contemporaneously with each other between 2006 and 2009, and yet
they reach a multitude of different interpretations of virtually identical
language contained in various BITs.
What is particularly important for analyzing the likely
interpretation of China’s BITs in future investment disputes is the
treatment of MFN clauses by the six tribunals discussed in this article.
That is because China has since entered into a new generation BITs.
Whereas China had thought prior to Tza that the jurisdictional remit of
its earlier BITs was restrictive, its later BITs executed since 2003 have
openly broad language on jurisdiction. If the previous generations
BITs are read by future tribunals to contain MFN clauses allowing

14

Id. ¶ 30.
Id. ¶ 31.
16
Id.
17
Id. ¶ 32.
18
Id. The decision on the merits in Tza was issued July 5, 2011. Mr. Tza
was awarded over $700,000 in damages and $200,000 in interest.
19
One is an English High Court decision, which reviews an ad hoc
arbitral tribunal award and its interpretation of the similar BIT terms. Czech
Republic v. European Media Ventures, [2007] EWHC (Comm) 2851, [2007] 2
C.L.C. 908 (Eng.).
15
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broadened jurisdiction, then all prior China BITs would benefit from
the broader jurisdictional language of its new BITs.

I.

NATIONALITY OF THE FOREIGN INVESTOR IN TZA

The first issue raised by Peru in defense of the Tza claim relates
to Mr. Tza’s nationality.20 Peru argued that Mr. Tza’s residence in
Hong Kong made his reliance on the China-Peru BIT improper.21 Peru
said Mr. Tza must rely upon the separate Hong Kong-Peru BIT.22 This
issue was a threshold issue for the arbitral tribunal in considering its
jurisdiction over the claim because foreign nationality for an investor is
crucial to ICSID jurisdiction. The issue is also very important to China
investment dispute analysis because it involves the relationship
between the PRC and Hong Kong SAR BITs.
ICSID jurisdiction requires three elements, namely a qualified
foreign investor (personal jurisdiction or rationae personae), an
investment dispute (subject-matter jurisdiction or rationae materiae)
and consent.23 Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention provides as
follows:
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any
legal dispute arising directly out of an investment
between a Contracting State (or any constituent
subdivision or agency of a Contracting State
designated to the Centre by that State) and a national
of another Contracting State, which the parties to the
dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.

20

Id. ¶ 42.
Id.
22
Id. ¶ 48.
23
See CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A
COMMENTARY 71-341 (2d ed. 2009), David A. Williams, Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
871 (Christoph Schreuer ed., 2008); accord Devashishm Krishan, Nationality of
Physical Persons, in INVESTMENT TREATY LAW: CURRENT ISSUES II, 57-66
(British Inst. of Int’l and Comparative L. 2007); Roberto Aguirre Luzi & Ben
Love, Individual Nationality in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Tension
between Customary International Law and Lex Specialis, in INVESTMENT
TREATY LAW: CURRENT ISSUES III 183-208 (British Inst. of Int’l and
Comparative L. 2009).
21
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When the parties have given their consent, no party
may withdraw its consent unilaterally.24
Investors, individuals or corporations, allowed to bring an ICSID
claim against the host state must meet a twofold nationality
requirement: (i) a positive nationality requirement--the investor must
have the nationality of a contracting state, and (ii) a negative nationality
requirement--the investor must not be a national of the host state. 25 The
nationality requirement is derived from the principle that disputes
between a local investor and its own state should naturally be resolved
before local state courts. Therefore, jurisdiction in ICSID is confined to
international investments disputes, i.e., investment disputes between a
foreign investor and the host state.
In Tza, the ICSID jurisdiction was based on the China-Peru BIT
(1994). The ICSID tribunal was asked to determine the positive
nationality requirement, whether under Article 25(2) and the relevant
provisions of the applicable BIT, (a) the Chinese investor had met his
burden to prove his nationality under Chinese law, and (b) even if the
burden was satisfied, his residence in Hong Kong prevented him from
having recourse to the China-Peru BIT.26

A. NATIONALITY OF THE FOREIGN INVESTOR AS A NATURAL PERSON
Article 25(2) of the ICSID Convention defines the foreign ‘natural
person’ as follows:
[A]ny natural person who had the nationality of a
Contracting State other than the State party to the
dispute on the date on which the parties consented to
submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration as
well as on the date on which the request was
registered pursuant to paragraph (3) of Article 28 or
paragraph (3) of Article 36, but does not include any
person who on either date also had the nationality of
the Contracting State party to the dispute. 27
The dual requirement under Article 25(2), that the natural person
be a national of the contracting state but not a national of the host state,
24

ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 1, at Art. 25(1).
Id. at Art. 25(3).
26
Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 42 (Feb. 12, 2007).
27
ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 1, at Art. 25(2).
25
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excludes persons with a dual nationality in the State party to the
dispute.28 This nationality requirement is also a continuous
requirement, and must be met on the date the parties consented to
arbitration and on the date the foreign national files his request for
arbitration.
Determination of nationality by ICSID tribunals is guided by two
principles. First, the ICSID Convention itself does not set terms for the
determination of the nationality of an individual. According to
international law, the issue of nationality is usually dealt with by
reference to the law of the State whose nationality is claimed. 29 The
law governing the dispute, under Article 42 of the ICSID Convention,
does not apply to the nationality of the individual claimant. 30
Chinese BITs provide that a natural person qualifies as a Chinese
investor when such person has the nationality of the PRC in accordance
with its laws.31 Questions of nationality are to be determined by

28
David A. Williams, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 884-85 (Christoph Schreuer
ed., 2008).
29
Tza, ¶ 54 (“There is no question that according to international law it is
for each State to determine who their nationals are under its law.”).
30
ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 1, at Art. 42.
31
Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of
China Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments
done at London on May 15, 1986, entered into force on May 15, 1986, 1462
U.N.T.S. 255 (“UK-China BIT”), Art. 1(c)(ii); Peru-China BIT, supra note 12,
at art. 1(2)(a); Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments Between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and
the Government of the People’s Republic of China done at Beijing on
November 26, 2011, 2369 U.N.T.S. 219 (“Netherlands-PRC BIT”), Art.
1(2)(a): “The term ‘investor’ means, (a) natural person who have the nationality
of either Contracting Party in accordance with the laws of that Contracting
Party.” The recent FTAs signed respectively between China and ASEAN
(Article 1(1)(i)) and New-Zealand (Article 135) provide for a unified definition
and extend the protection to “permanent residents:” “‘natural person of a Party’
means any natural person possessing the nationality or citizenship of, or right
of permanent residence in the Party in accordance with its laws and
regulations.” It is however to be noted that China does not have any domestic
law for the treatment of permanent residents of foreign countries. Treaties
available at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx.
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reference to the municipal law, subject to the applicable rules of
international law.32
Second, since the nationality of the individual claimant is a
jurisdictional requirement, tribunals also apply the conditions set forth
under the relevant municipal law in the frame of article 41 of the ICSID
Convention. Article 41 grants tribunals the power to be the judge of
their own competence.33 Therefore, a tribunal is empowered to finally
decide for itself and make its own ruling on the nationality of the
claimant, giving weight to the facts and municipal law before it.
Under the China-Peru BIT (1994), Chinese law was the applicable
law for the determination of Tza’s nationality. 34 Under the Nationality
Law of the PRC,35 Chinese nationality is acquired by birth, and
conferred upon any person born in China whose parents are both
Chinese nationals or one of whose parents is a Chinese national (Article
4). The Nationality Law of the PRC also provides that China does not
recognize dual nationality for any Chinese national (Article 3). Since
1997, the Nationality Law directly applies to the Hong Kong SAR by
way of promulgation and applies in the same way as it is applied in
China.36 In Tza, the claimant was born in 1948, in the Chinese province
of Fujian, but he had been a Hong Kong resident since 1972. He held a
Hong Kong SAR Passport stating he was born in China. Peru did not
contest claimant was born in China from Chinese parents, nor did it
allege that he had illegally acquired his nationality or had since
acquired another nationality. Rather the respondent challenged the
credibility of the evidence provided by the claimant 37 on the ground
32

Schreuer, supra note 23, ¶ 641.
ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 1, at Art. 41.
34
Peru-China BIT, supra note 12, at art. 1(2)(a).
35
The Nationality Law (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo guoji fa) was
adopted at the Third Session of the Fifth Chinese People’s National Assembly
(NPA) and effective as of September 10, 1980.
36
PRICILLA LEUNG MEI-FUN, THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW, HYBRID OF
COMMON LAW AND CHINESE LAW 93 (LexixNexis 2007). Pursuant to Article
18 and Annex III of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR, the Nationality
Law applied in the Hong Kong SAR from 1 July 1997. It was implemented
through the “Explanations of Some Questions Concerning the Implementation
of the Nationality Law of the PRC in the Hong Kong SAR” adopted by the
Standing Committee of the NPA on May 15, 1996, a year prior to the Hong
Kong handover that came into effect on July 1, 1997.
37
Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 55-56 (Feb. 12, 2007). Namely a
copy of the HKSR passport showing his birth place was in Fujian, China, and a
copy of the Hong Kong ID Card, an affidavit stating his was born in China.
33
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that it was merely prima facie evidence of the claimant’s nationality
and that definitive proof of Chinese nationality required the production
of the birth certificate, failing which Chinese nationality was not
established. Mr. Tza was not able to provide his birth certificate since
the relevant registry had been destroyed in 1949.
The examination of the evidence by the tribunal followed the
consensus that an official document issued by the relevant competent
national authority on the nationality of the party should be regarded as
prima facie evidence of nationality only, 38 and that the issue was for the
decision of the tribunal on all the evidence:
Therefore, according to the Nationality Act as
interpreted by the Permanent Committee of the
People’s National Assembly for its application to
Hong Kong, it seems to be clear, prima facie, that
Claimant validly holds the Chinese nationality…. In
the opinion of the Tribunal, the nationality conferred
by a state to a person under its law has a strong
presumption of validity. 39
The Tza tribunal referred to and adopted the solution found in Micula v.
Romania.40 It balanced the burden of proof and determined that
claimant’s evidence created a presumption that could be questioned,
but the burden of proof then shifted to the respondent to invalidate such
presumption and prove that the nationality was acquired in a manner
that is inconsistent with international law.
This solution is also found in customary law embodied in the
International Law Commission Draft Articles of Diplomatic Protection
which provides under Article 4 that for the purpose of the diplomatic
protection, “State of nationality means a State whose nationality that
person has acquired, in accordance with the law of that state, by birth,
descent, naturalization, succession of States or in any other manner, not
inconsistent with international law.”41

38

ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INVESTMENT LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS ¶
537 (Cambridge Press Univ. 2009).
39
Tza, ¶ 62-63.
40
Id.
41
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, UN Doc. A/61/10, Art. 4, 61st
Sess. Supp No. 10 (2006), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts
/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_8_2006.pdf.
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Pursuant to the Sino-British Joint Declaration of December 19,
1984 (the Joint Declaration), the PRC resumed sovereignty over Hong
Kong July 1, 1997. Peru claimed that even if the claimant’s nationality
were Chinese, under the law of the PRC, Hong Kong residents may not
have recourse to the Sino-Peru BIT. This raised the question of the
scope of application of the Sino-Peru BIT: whether it excluded Hong
Kong residents. The respondent claimed HKSAR residents were
excluded from the scope of application of this BIT because of the set of
laws governing the relationship between the Mainland and the HKSAR,
such as the Joint Statement and the Basic Law which listed the
international conventions that were applicable to Hong Kong, among
which the BIT at stake was not listed, and the numbers of BITs signed
by Hong Kong with others States, among which was a Peru-Hong
Kong BIT.
The tribunal took the view that the standard of its duty was in the
terms of the ICSID Convention, and its duty under Article 25 of the
ICSID Convention was limited to verifying whether claimant had the
nationality of a “Contracting State.” The tribunal found that the
claimant met his burden, proving that all Chinese nationals, including
those residing in Hong Kong, were included in the scope of Article
25.42 The tribunal did not entertain an examination of the relevant sets
of laws and BITs.
Instead, it primarily relied on the general rules of interpretation of
treaties. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT) provides that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith and in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in its context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 43 The
Tza tribunal noted that the BIT provision in respect of the Chinese
investor nationality requirement merely provided “natural persons who
have nationality of the PRC in accordance with its laws” and the
intention of the Contracting Parties had to be considered as expressly
provided for in the terms of the BIT, in accordance with Article 31.44
Therefore the tribunal held Peru had not proven convincingly that the

42

Tza, ¶ 70.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan, 27, 1980, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, Art. 31(1), available at http://www.oas.org/dil/Vienna
_Convention_on_the_Law_of_Treaties.pdf.
44
Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 72 (Feb. 12, 2007), citing PeruChina BIT, supra note 12, at art. 1(2)(a).
43
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Contracting Parties, Peru and China, had the intention to exclude Hong
Kong residents from the scope of this BIT.45
Finally, the Tza tribunal found that it is not superfluous for Hong
Kong to conclude its own investment treaties with countries that China
also has entered into BITs. Hong Kong has historically been home to
people with multiple nationalities. For that reason the government “has
deployed a policy that seeks the promotion and protection of
investments in other countries for the benefit of all of its residents,
regardless of their nationalities.”46 Indeed Hong Kong BITs concluded
before 1997 and even thereafter provide for protection covering persons
who have a right to abode regardless of their nationality. 47

B. NATIONALITY OF THE FOREIGN INVESTOR AS A CORPORATION
The second category of investors, juridical persons, are defined
under Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID. The ICSID distinguishes between
two types of foreign juridical persons: either the corporation has a
nationality different from the one of the host state, or the corporation
has the nationality of the host state but is under foreign control.
Different from natural persons, the nationality requirement for juridical
persons is not continuous and must be met only at the time the parties
agreed to arbitrate. The ICSID convention does not define the term
juridical person, but it is understood the entity must have legal
personality.48 Nor does the ICSID Convention define the juridical
person’s nationality. It is left to BITs to define it. In order to determine
the nationality of the corporation, traditional private international law
uses the test of the place of incorporation (or registered office) or the
effective seat (siege social) and the control test. Chinese BITs shows
use of these tests and have often combined them. 49 The place of
incorporation is often used.50 The place of incorporation and the seat

45

Id. ¶ 74.
Id. ¶ 76.
47
Id.
48
SCHREUER, supra note 23, ¶ 693; See also Williams, supra note 28, at
46

890.
49

Shan & Gallagher, supra note 11, ¶¶ 2.52-71.
UK-China BIT, supra note 31, at art. 1(d)(ii) (“in respect of the
People’s Republic of China: corporations, firms or associations incorporated or
constituted under the law in force in any part of the People’s Republic of
China.”).
50
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criteria are combined to narrow the scope of application.51 The control
test does not seem to have been used as the sole test but only as an
alternative to the other tests.52
The Tza decision left unresolved the status of companies
incorporated in Hong Kong. That issue did not arise because a Chinese
natural person made the Peruvian investment.
Pursuant to the resumption of sovereignty and the Basic Law,
coming into force on July 1, 1997, the Hong Kong SAR has been
granted legislative powers under Article 2 of the Basic Law and has
conserved its pre-1997 common law system.53 In particular, Hong
Kong companies are subject to a body of statutes based on common
law (the Companies Ordinance Chapter 32), while Mainland companies
are subject to the Company Law of the PRC as revised in 2005. Article
18(3) of the Basic Law provides for the application of “national laws”
in the Hong Kong SAR limited to a list of laws specifically identified
(See Annex III of the Basic Law which expressly includes the above
mentioned Nationality Law).54
Also, in compliance with Article 151 of the Basic Law, 55 HK has
51
Peru-China BIT, supra note 12, at art. 1(2)(b) (“in respect of the
People’s Republic of China: economic entities established in accordance with
the laws of the People’s Republic of China and domiciled in the territory of the
People’s Republic of China.”).
52
China-Peru Free Trade Agreement, China-Peru, done at Beijing on
Apr. 28, 2009 (“China-Peru FTA”), ch. 10, art. 126 (definition of Investors:
“(a)(ii) economic entities established in accordance with the laws of the
People’s Republic of China and domiciled in the territory of the People’s
Republic of China; or (iii) legal entities not established under the law of the
People’s Republic of China but effectively controlled, by natural persons, as
defined in subparagraph (a)(i) [Chinese nationals] or by economic entities as
defined in subparagraph (a)(ii), that have made an investment in the territory of
the other Party.”), available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml.
53
The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
the People’s Republic of China [Constitution] Dec. 19, 1984, ch. I, art. 2 (“The
National People's Congress authorizes the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative
and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication, in
accordance with the provisions of this Law.), ch. II, art. 17 (“The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region shall be vested with legislative power.”),
available at http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/index.html.
54
Id.
55
Id. at ch. VII, art. 151 (“The Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region may on its own, using the name “Hong Kong, China,” maintain and
develop relations and conclude and implement agreements with foreign states
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continued to enter into international agreements, including BITs.56 In
these BITs, Hong Kong investors as legal persons are defined as:
“corporations, partnerships and associations incorporated or constituted
under the law in force in its area” (Article 4(b) of the Thailand-Hong
Hong 2005 BIT, Article 1(f)(ii) of the UK-Hong Kong 1998 BIT).57 In
addition, in the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangement (CEPA) dated June 29, 1999, the juridical person as
service supplier under CEPA is defined in relation to the applicable
laws of the area of each party to CEPA, as follows:
“juridical person” means any legal entity duly
constituted or otherwise organized under the
applicable laws of the Mainland or the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, whether for profit or
otherwise, and whether privately-owned or
governmentally-owned, including any corporation,
trust, partnership, joint venture, sole proprietorship or
association (business association) (Emphasis
added).58
Thus, unlike for natural persons where the Nationality Law has
expressly been extended to Hong Kong under Annex III of the Basic

and regions and relevant international organizations in the appropriate fields,
including the economic, trade, financial and monetary, shipping,
communications, tourism, cultural and sports fields.”); See also Sun Zhichao,
International Legal Personality of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region , 7 CHINESE J. OF INT’L L., no. 2, 2008, at 339, 339-352, available at
http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/7/2/339.full.pdf.
56
Agreement between the Government of Hong Kong and the
Government of Japan for the Promotion and Protection of Investment done at
Tokyo May 15, 1997, entered into force June 18, 1997, (“Hong Kong-Japan
BIT”); Agreement between the Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China and the Government
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Promotion
and Protection of Investments done at Hong Kong July 30, 1998, entered into
force Apr. 12, 1999, (“Hong Kong-UK BIT”); Agreement between the
Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments done at Busan Nov. 19, 2005, entered
into force Apr. 18, 2006, (“Thailand-Hong Kong BIT”), all BITs available at
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx.
57
Id.
58
The Mainland/Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement
(CEPA) (China 2003) (Article 2.3 to Annex 5 to the CEPA).
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law, the definition of Chinese companies in Chinese BITs by the
double requirement, “economic entities established in accordance with
the laws of the PRC and domiciled in the territory of the PRC,” leaves
the situation unresolved for companies incorporated in Hong Kong.
The second requirement, i.e. establishment in the PRC, has been met
since the resumption of sovereignty in 1997. However, the first
requirement does not seem to be met if the term “the laws of the PRC”
is construed, in the context of companies, to mean “national laws” or
“law of the Mainland” as opposed to “laws of Hong Kong.” In such a
case, companies incorporated under the laws of Hong Kong are not
covered by Chinese BITs.59
There remains the role of Hong Kong as a transhipping (and even a
round shipping centre) 60 in particular for Chinese public and private
investors who use Hong Kong companies to invest abroad. If controlled
by Chinese investors, the latter may have resort to the control test used
in recent Chinese BITs, to claim protection under Chinese BITs, under
the following definition: “legal entities not established under the law of
the PRC but effectively controlled, by natural persons, as defined in
subparagraph (a)(i) [Chinese nationals] or by economic entities as
defined in subparagraph (a)(ii), that have made an investment in the
territory of the other Party.” 61

II. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS UNDER CHINESE BITS
BITs impose procedural steps before an aggrieved investor may
trigger an international arbitration under the auspices of ICSID. Two
mandatory procedural steps were contained in the China-Peru BIT: (i) a
waiting or cooling off period of six months for amicable settlement,
and (ii) the exercise of a choice of either local court process or
international arbitration.62

59
Contra Shan & Gallagher, supra note 11, ¶¶ 2.76-.80 (stating that
Hong Kong corporate entities are, in principle, covered by Chinese BITs unless
expressly excluded, as in the 2006 Russia-China BIT (which has not entered
into force)).
60
A “round shipping” center means an investment made by a Chinese
citizen in a Hong Kong company for reinvestment in the PRC.
61
China-Peru FTA, supra note 52, at ch. 10, art.126 “Investors” (a)(iii).
62
Id.
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A. WAITING PERIOD
In the Peru-China BIT (1994), consent to arbitration is subject to
the condition that the dispute cannot be settled by negotiation.63
Investors are required to attempt an amicable settlement to solve the
dispute through negotiation or consultation prior to having recourse to
arbitration.64 This requires the investor to observe a “waiting period”
or “cooling off” period, which was set in the treaty at six months.65
The starting date of the waiting period may not be provided66 or it
might be triggered by the event giving rise to the dispute (state action,
such as enactment of a statute) or from the “date when [the dispute] has
been raised by one of the parties in dispute.” 67 In others, the date is
measured from a written notification of the dispute, 68 or from a
“request for consultations and negotiations” 69 from “the date either
party requested amicable settlement.” 70 For example, in the 2008

63
Peru-China BIT, supra note 12, at art. 8(1) (“Any dispute between an
investor of one Contracting Party and the other Contracting Party in connection
with an investment in the territory of the other Contracting Party shall, as far as
possible, be settled amicably through negotiations between the parties to the
dispute.”).
64
China-Peru FTA, supra note 52, at art. 139(1).
65
Peru-China BIT, supra note 12, at art. 8(3).
66
See Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Botswana
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Promotion and
Protection of Investments done at Beijing June 12, 2000, (“China-Botswana
BIT”), art. 9(2), available at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch
____779.aspx.
67
Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Federal
Republic of Germany on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Beijing, December 1, 2003, 2362 U.N.T.S. 253 (“China-German
BIT”) Art, 9(1) (Entered into force November 11, 2005).
68
See UK-China BIT, supra note 31, at art. 7(1).
69
Free Trade Agreement in Between the Government of the Peoples
Republic of China and the Government of New Zealand, (“China-New Zealand
FTA”) art. 152 (Entered into force Oct. 1, 2008) available at
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/ennewzealand.shtml.
70
China-Netherlands BIT, supra note 31, at art. 10(3); see also
Agreement between the Czech Republic and the People’s Republic of China on
the Promotion and Protection of Investments done at Prague Dec. 8, 2005,
(“Czech-China BIT”), art. 9(2) (“six months of the date when the request for
the
settlement
has
been
submitted.”),
available
at
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx; Agreement on
Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Association of
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China-Mexico BIT a formal notice requirement is found with a notice
period of “at least 6 months.”71 Consent clauses do not merely provide
for a waiting requirement but also require the parties to take active
action in trying to settle amicably. The wording of the clause “shall” or
“should” may be binding.
More recent BITs also require, in addition to the above, a notice
period before arbitration proceedings,72 and in certain cases, the service
of a notice of claim followed by observance of an additional 3 or 6
month notice period prior to starting arbitration. 73 Therefore, this raises
the occurrence of a double notice period (notice for negotiation and
notice of intent to arbitrate) and a double waiting period (negotiation
period and arbitration notice period).
Arbitral tribunals have examined waiting clauses by taking note of
the compliance of the investor with this clause. In some cases,
tribunals have tested its legal effect when there is a claim of alleged
non-compliance with the requirement. Decisions are not unanimous on
the issue, but most decisions hold that the failure to respect the
negotiation time limit has no effect on the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
These tribunals hold that the waiting period constitutes a mere
procedural requirement74 that does not affect the standing of the claim
as long as it can be shown that no prospect of amicable solution could
be found. In Goetz v Burundi, which involved the Burundi-Belgium
BIT 1989, the pre-arbitration procedural requirement included (i)
written notice of intent prior to arbitration, and (ii) 3 months
negotiation at diplomatic level between contracting states seems to be
more restrictive because of the level of negotiation. 75

Southeast Asian Nations, Bangkok, August 15, 2009 (“China – ASEAN FTA)
art. 14(4) (Entered into force February 15, 2010).
71
Agreement between the Government of the United Mexican States and
the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments done at Beijing July 11, 2008, entered
into force June 6, 2009, (“Mexico-China BIT”), art. 12(2) & Appendix A,
available at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx.
72
China-New Zealand FTA, supra note 69, at art. 153(2).
73
See China-Peru FTA, supra note 52, at art. 139(4).
74
Enron Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 88 (Jan. 14, 2004) (discussing whether the waiting
period is a procedural or jurisdictional requirement), available at
http://www.asil.org/ilib/Enron.pdf.
75
Goetz v. Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, Award, ( Feb. 10,
1999), 15 ICSID Rev.-F.I.L.J. 454 (2000), available at http://italaw.com/
documents/Goetz-Award.pdf.
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There are cases, however, where tribunals have given force to the
interaction of a notice of claim requirement and negotiation
requirement. In Western NIS Enterprise Fund v Ukraine, the tribunal
ordered the claimant to comply with the notice of intent prior to
arbitration and suspended the proceedings from the date of
notification.76 In Ethyl Corp. v Canada, the tribunal found that
claimant’s failure to exhaust the waiting period did not affect its
jurisdiction, yet it considered the proceedings premature. 77 The
tribunal did not suspend the arbitral process to demand compliance, but
granted damages to the respondent for breach of the term.

B. EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES AND FORK IN THE ROAD CLAUSE.
Exhaustion of local remedies is a concept traditionally used in
investment arbitration as a condition precedent to access to
international arbitration. Whether exhaustion of local remedies is
required when jurisdiction is based upon a BIT is a matter of wording
of each treaty. Article 26 of the ICSID Convention provides:
Consent of the parties to arbitration under this
Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, be deemed
consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any
other remedy. A Contracting State may require the
exhaustion of local administrative or judicial
remedies as a condition of its consent to arbitration
under this Convention.78
The effect of this provision is to reverse the situation under
customary international law in that the contracting states waive the
traditional requirement of exhaustion of local remedies unless
otherwise stated.79 If a state conditions its consent to arbitrate to
exhaustion of local remedies in a BIT, then this requirement trumps the

76
W. NS Enter. Fund v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/2, Order,
(March 16, 2006), available at http://italaw.com/documents/ARB042 _ORDER
reNotice.pdf.
77
Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, UNICTRAL (NAFTA), Award on Jurisdiction,
¶ 88 (June 24, 1998), 38 ILM 708 (1999), available at
http://italaw.com/documents/Ethyl-Award.pdf.
78
ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 1, at Art. 26.
79
See CHRISTOPHER DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 347
(2008) (presentation of an exhaustion of local remedies under customary
international law).
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first sentence of Article 26.80 In investment arbitration, it is rare that
consent would require exhaustion of local remedies as a condition
precedent to access arbitration, as the very aim of investment
agreements is to grant the foreign investor a direct right to international
arbitration against the host state. Requirement of exhaustion would
seem to contradict this very principle, but the ICSID Convention
permits it.
“Fork in the road clauses” are opposites to the requirement of
exhaustion of local remedies. Under a fork in the road clause, the
investor may lose access to international arbitration by selecting local
remedies. Typical BIT fork in the road clauses require the investor to
choose a forum at the outset of the dispute resolution process: the
claimant irrevocably elects a procedural remedy when it commences its
legal proceedings in either the courts of the host state or international
arbitration.81 The wording of the relevant BIT clauses may differ and
each must be examined carefully. For example, the China-Argentina
BIT provides: “Where an investor has submitted a dispute either to the
aforementioned competent tribunal of the Contracting Party where the
investment has been made or to international arbitration, this choice
shall be final.”82
Sometimes the wording of the clause does not make the intention
explicit and construction by the tribunal is required. For instance, in
Tza, the China-Peru BIT (1994) contained wording that was described
by the tribunal as a fork in the road clause:
2. If the dispute cannot be settled through
negotiations within six months, either party to the
dispute shall be entitled to submit this dispute to the
80

SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 388, 390-91.
Christoph Schreuer, Consent to Arbitration, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 830, 848 (Peter Muchlinski et
al eds., 2008), see also Christoph Schreuer, Travelling the BIT Route of Waiting
Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE,
no. 2, Apr. 2004, at 231.
82
Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China
and the Government of the Argentine Republic on the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments done at Beijing on Nov. 5, 1992, entered
into force June. 17, 1994, 1862 U.N.T.S. 3 (“China-Argentina BIT”), art. 8(3).
See also; Agreement between Japan and the People’s Republic of China
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment done
at Beijing on Aug. 27, 1988, entered into force May 14, 1989, 1555 U.N.T.S.
197 (“Japan-China BIT”), all BITS available at http://www.unctadxi.org/
templates/docsearch____779.aspx.
81
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Party

3. If a dispute involving the amount of compensation
for expropriation cannot be settled within six months
after resort to negotiations as specified in Para. 1 of
this Art., it may be submitted at the request of either
party to the international arbitration of ICSID. Any
disputes concerning other matters between an
investor of either Contracting Party and the other
Contracting Party may be submitted to the Centre if
the parties to the disputes so agree. The provisions
of this Para. shall not apply if the investor
concerned has resorted to the procedure specified
in Para. 2 of this Art. (emphasis added).83
In Tza, the fork in the road issue arose in the context of construing
the meaning of the arbitration consent clause under Article 8(3). The
tribunal found the fork in the road clause acted to prevent the claimant
from ever exercising the choice for arbitration. It found that under this
BIT, (i) if state courts have exclusive jurisdiction for the liability stage
of the dispute as affirmed in Article 8(2), and (ii) if recourse to state
courts bars access to international arbitration as affirmed in Article
8(3), then there existed no possibility to arbitrate the dispute at all. 84
As held by the Tza tribunal, the arbitrator finds himself with an
“irrevocable either or choice, also known as folk in the road, may not
under any circumstance make use of ICSID arbitration to settle the
dispute involving the amount of compensation for expropriation.” 85

III. CONSENT CLAUSE TO ARBITRATION
Consent to ISCID jurisdiction is a two-step process. First, the
home state of the investor and the host state must be party to the ISCID
Convention (Contracting States).86 Failure to ratify the ICSID
Convention by the state of either party prevents ICSID jurisdiction.
Hence, non-Contracting States must use alternative arbitration rules,
83

Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 159 (Feb. 12, 2007).
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Williams, supra note 28, at 872 (stating that it is often seen as the
Contract State’s personal jurisdiction requirement).
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such as ICSID additional facilities, the International Chamber of
Commerce rules, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center rules
or ad-hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules. Before
China’s ratification of the ICSID Convention, Chinese BITs provided
for ad-hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL rules. Some Chinese BITs
also anticipated China’s ratification and consented to ICSID
jurisdiction, conditional upon China ratifying the Washington
Convention,87 or by requiring the signature of a protocol after
ratification.88 After ratification of the Convention, most Chinese BITs
immediately offered ICSID as the sole forum or as an option.89 Only a
few Chinese BITs continued to use ad-hoc arbitration.90

87

Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China
and Spain on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments
done at Madrid on Feb. 9, 1992, entered into force May 1, 1993, 1746 U.N.T.S.
167, (“China-Spain BIT”), art. 9(2) (allowing the investor to choose ICSID
arbitration, if both states become party to the ICSID convention, for disputes
concerning an amount of compensation referred to in Article 4 [expropriation]);
See also Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and
the Government of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments done at Peking on
Nov. 8, 1993, entered into force June 1. 1994, 2366 U.N.T.S. 42647
(“Lithuania-China BIT”), art. 8(2)(c); Agreement between the Government of
the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the State of Bahrain
concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment done
at Beijing on June 17, 1999, entered into force Jan. 4, 2000, (“China-Bahrain
BIT”),
art.
9(3)(b),
all
BITS
available
at
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx.
88
Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments between the
Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the People’s
Republic of China done at Beijing on Mar. 29, 1982, entered into force Mar.
29, 1982, 1350 U.N.T.S. 247 (“Sweden-China BIT”), Protocol, available at
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx.
89
China-Peru BIT, supra note 12, at art. 8(3). Contra Kim M. Rooney,
ICSID and BIT Arbitrations and China, 24 J. OF INT’L ARB., no. 6, 2007, at 704
(stating that after China’s accession to the Washington Convention became
effective it took some years for references to ICSID arbitration as an alternative
dispute resolution method to be generally included in the first generation of
China BITs).
90
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and
the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion and
Protection of Investments done at Jakarta on Nov. 18, 1994, entered into force
Apr. 1, 1995, 1901 U.N.T.S. 291 (“Indonesia-China BIT”), art. 9(3) (“If a
dispute involving the amount of compensation resulting from expropriation
cannot be settled as specified in paragraph 1 of this Article within six months, it
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Second, there must be a specific consent in writing to arbitration
between the investor from a Contracting State, the foreign investor, and
the host state.91 This specific consent in writing may be found in direct
agreements entered into between the foreign investor and the host state.
In BITs, specific consent in writing is derived from the meeting of a
binding offer to arbitrate made in the BIT by the host state to qualifying
investors, on the one hand, and an acceptance of the offer by a
qualifying investor resulting from the submission of a claim against the
host state before the arbitration center.92 The scope of the consent to
arbitration contained in the host state’s binding offer directly affects the
tribunal’s subject matter and personal jurisdiction. It is particularly true
with respect to Chinese BITs, with the consent clauses worded to
reflect each of the stages of China’s international economic and
investment policy.

A. SCOPE OF CONSENT IN CHINESE BITS
In order to determine the scope of the consent to arbitration, each
treaty has its own wording and no general rule can be drawn. Some
treaty consent clauses are very general and include broad wording, such
as “any legal dispute … concerning an investment.” Other clauses are
worded in more limited terms.93 China BITs consent clauses provide a
good illustration of differences.94
China’s first BIT with Sweden in 1982 did not contain any direct
investor-State dispute arbitration clause. 95 Subsequent Chinese BITs
may be submitted to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal.”), available at
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx.
91
ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 1, at Art. 25.
92
See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. –
FOREIGN INV. L. J., no. 2, Fall 1995, at 232, available at http://www.arbitrationicca.org/media/0/12254614477540/jasp_article__arbitration_without_privity.pdf; DUGAN ET AL., supra note 78, at 219;
Schreuer, Consent to Arbitration, supra note 79, at 832.
93
See presentation of all types of limitations on consent in treaties, in
SCHREUER, supra note 23, ¶ 526-540.
94
See Kong Qingjiang, “Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Chinese
Approach and Practice,” in ASIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Volume
8, 2003 Brill, p. 105 ¶ 4.8.
95
Sweden – China BIT, supra note 88. See also Agreement between the
Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the People's
Republic of China Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Bangkok, March 12, 1985 1443 U.N.T.S. 31 (“China-Thailand
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limited consent clauses to the amount of compensation resulting from
one or some of the rights granted under the BIT. For example, China
BITs used these various phrasing: “the dispute concerning the amount
of compensation referred to in para. 3 of Article 5 [protection of
investments and returns];” 96 “dispute involving the amount of
compensation resulting from expropriation, nationalization, or other
measures having effect equivalent to nationalization or
expropriation;”97 “if the disputes concerns the amount of compensation
referred to in Art. 4 [expropriation];”98 “dispute . . . concerning an
amount of compensation.”99
In Tza, the China-Peru BIT provided under Article 8(3): “If a
dispute involving the amount of compensation for expropriation cannot
be settled within six months after resort to negotiations as specified in
Para. 1 of this Art., it may be submitted at the request of either party to
the international arbitration of ICSID.” 100 This type of consent clause is
BIT”) (no investor-State dispute resolution clause); Agreement between the
Government Australia and the Government of the People's Republic of China
on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Beijing, July
11, 1988, 1514 U.N.T.S. 65 (“China-Australia BIT”) (providing only for local
judicial or administrative remedy, and arbitration in a third country to be agreed
upon subsequently).
96
Japan-China BIT, supra note 82, at Art. 11.
97
Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China
and the Government of the Republic of Singapore on the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Beijing, November 21, 1985, 1443 U.N.T.S. 279
(“China-Singapore BIT”) Art. 13 (February 7, 1986)
98
Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China
and the Government of the Hellenic Republic for the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Beijing, June 25, 1992 (“China-Greece
BIT”) Art. 10(2); Accord Agreement between the Government of the People’s
Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Ghana Concerning
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Beijing, October
12, 1989 (“China-Ghana BIT”) Art. 10(1) (providing for ad-hoc arbitration for
disputes “concerning the amount of compensation for expropriation”); China
and Denmark Agreement concerning the encouragement and reciprocal
protection of investments, Beijing, April 29, 1985 (“China-Denmark BIT
1985”) Art. 8(3) (“dispute involving the amount of compensation resulting from
expropriation mentioned in article 4”).
99
UK-China BIT, supra note 31, at Art. 7(1).
100
Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 144 (Feb. 12, 2007), see also
Spain and China Agreement on reciprocal encouragement and protection of
investments, Madrid, February 6, 1992, 1746 U.N.T.S. 167 (“China-Spain
BIT”) Art. 9(2) (“concerning an amount of compensation referred to in Article
4 [expropriation]”); Monika C E. Heymann, International Law and the
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similar to those in BITs signed by the former Soviet Union, the Czech
Republic and Hungary, and they will be examined in detail infra
Section C.
The traditional interpretation of these clauses limited the
arbitrator’s jurisdiction to determine the amount of compensation for
expropriation. The fact of expropriation would have to be decided by
the local courts. One author has said this “tradition” had been broken
by two BITs entered into with Germany and the Netherlands. 101
However, the change was more subtle than that. The beginning of
change in China BITs was with the insertion of comprehensive dispute
settlement clauses, providing for either ad-hoc or ICSID arbitration, in
the late 1990’s102 with the 1998 China-Barbados BIT103 and was
followed by the 2000 China-Botswana BIT,104 the 2000 China-Iran
BIT,105 and the 2001 Jordan-China BIT.106 Thereafter, they were
Settlement of Investment Disputes relating to China, 11 J. Int’l Econ. L., 507526 (2008) (China-Lithuania BIT, China-Bahrain 1999 BIT quoted in fn 60 and
61, respectively).
101
Peter J. Turner, Investor-State Arbitration, MANAGING BUSINESS
DISPUTES IN TODAY’S CHINA – DUELLING WITH DRAGONS 234 (Michael J.
Moser ed., 2007).
102
See Wang Guiguo, China’s Practice in International Investment Law:
From Participation to Leadership in the World Economy, 34 YALE J. INT’L L.
575, 584-85 (2009), see also Stephan W. Schill, Tearing down the Great Wall:
the New Generation Investment Treaties of the People’s Republic of China, 15
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 73, 89-93 (2007).
103
Agreement Between the Government of Barbados and The
Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Bridgetown, July 20, 1998 (“China – Barbados
BIT”), but see Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of
China and the Government of the State of Bahrain Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Beijing, June 17,
1999 (“China – Bahrain BIT”) art. 9 (The dispute clause limited ad-hoc tribunal
or ICSID arbitration to disputes regarding the amount of the compensation for
expropriation or nationalization).
104
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Botswana
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Beijing, June 12, 2000 (“China – Botswana BIT”)
art. 9(3) (not yet entered into force) (Providing for dispute settlement via ICSID
or ad-hoc arbitral tribunal, the latter of which allows the contracting party
involved to require exhaustion of domestic remedies).
105
Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment
between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Beijing, June 22, 2000 (“Iran – China BIT”) art. 12 (provides
for ad-hoc arbitration for “any dispute … with respect to an investment.”).
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followed by the renegotiated China-German and China-Netherlands
BITs in 2001 and 2003, respectively. China has now entered into 90
BITs and more than 30 contain a comprehensive dispute resolution
clause.
The scope of the arbitration clauses in the newer Chinese BITs is
broad. For example, new Chinese BIT dispute resolution clauses
provide for “any dispute … in connection with an investment,” 107 or
“concerning an investment,”108 or “with respect to an investment,” 109 or
“related to an investment.”110 It also includes in other BITs “any
investment dispute”111 or “any legal dispute.”112 The new model
Chinese BIT, Version III, provides for “any legal dispute … in
106
Agreement Between the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Amman, November 5,
2001 (“Jordan – China BIT”) art. 10 (not yet entered into force) (provides
for the option of ICSID or ad-hoc arbitration at the investor’s request “for any
legal dispute”); see generally Shan & Gallagher, supra note 11, at 42, (list as of
July 2008 of Chinese BITs and FTAs with open access to international
arbitration).
107
China – Bahrain BIT, supra note 103, at art. 9(1); China – Botswana
BIT, supra note 104, at art. 9(1); Agreement Between the Czech Republic and
the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Prague, December 8, 2005 (“Czech Republic – China BIT) Art.
9(1).
108
Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of
investments between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and
the Government of the People's Republic of China (with protocol). Beijing,
November 26, 2001, 2369 U.N.T.S. 219 (“China – Netherlands BIT) Art.10(1)
(Entered into force August 1, 2004); see also China-German BIT, supra note
67, at Art, 9(1).
109
Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment
between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Beijing, June 22, 2000 (“Iran – China BIT”) Art. 12(1).
110
Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and
the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Beijing, November 9, 2006 (“ChinaRussia BIT”) Art. 9(1).
111
China – Barbados BIT, supra note 103, art.10; see also Axel Berger,
Ger. Dev. Inst., China’s New Bilateral Investment Treaty Programme:
Substance, rational and implications for international investment law making,
11, n. 50 (2008) (Prepared for ASIL IELIG 2008 Biennial Conference “The
Politics of International Economic Law: The Next Four Years”) available at
http://www.asil.org/files/ielconferencepapers/berger.pdf.
112
Jordan – China BIT, supra note 106, at art. 10 (not yet entered into
force).
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connection with an investment.”113 Even the China-Pakistan FTA
Chapter IX Investment Agreement from 2006 provides for a scope of
consent similar to the wording of Chinese BITs: “Any legal dispute …
in connection with an investment.” 114
The wording in the newer China BITs is similar to the European
BITs’ consent clauses which provide for jurisdiction over “any dispute
concerning an investment.” 115 This broad clause would include not
only an investor’s claim for violation of the BIT’s substantive
standards, but also a claim made in connection with a contract arising
out of an investment.116 In particular, this language in a consent clause
has been construed to allow an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction over an
investor’s claims against the host state based on breach of a contract. 117
One author has questioned the possibility of applying this broad
wording to investment contracts on the grounds that such contracts are
not entered into with the state at all.118 However, it should be noted that
for investors in China the prevalence foreign investors who form
Chinese Joint Ventures with Chinese SOEs. Chinese SOEs are owned
by local or central government, and may in principle be subject to veil
piercing procedures.

113

CHINESE MODEL BIT VERSION III (Current) Art. 9(1), reprinted in
Shan & Gallagher, supra note 11, app. 4, at 436.
114
Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s
Republic of China and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
Islamabad, November 24, 2006 (“China-Pakistan FTA”) Art. 54.
115
UNITED KINGDOM MODEL BIT (2005), Art. 8, reprinted in Zachary
Douglas, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS, app. 10, at 564
(2009).
116
See SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 71-341; Schreuer, Consent to
Arbitration, supra note 81, at 830, 837-39; see also Shan & Gallagher, supra
note 11, ¶ 8.66, 327-28.
117
See Salini Costruttori S.P.A. and Italstrade S.P.A. v. Kingdom of
Morocco, ICSID Case no. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 43-49 (July
23, 2001), 6 ICSICD Rep. 400 (2004); SGS Société Générale de Surveillance
S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 128 (January 29, 2004) 8 ICSID Rep. 518 (2005);
Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, (July 3, 2002),
6 ICSID Rep. 340 (2004). See generally Schreuer, Consent to Arbitration,
supra note 81, at 830 837-39.
118
Shan & Gallagher, supra note 11, ¶ 8.68, 328-29.
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More recent Chinese BITs119 provide for a scope of consent limited
to treaty breaches: “disputes . . . arising from an alleged breach of an
obligation set forth in Chapter II entailing loss or damage” 120 or “[a]ny
legal dispute arising under this Chapter … directly concerning an
investment.”121 The arbitral jurisdiction in the ASEAN-China
Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Co-operation (ASEAN-China Investment
Agreement) is also expressly limited to claims for the breach of one of
the treaty standards.122 This newest formulation is in line the US
practice of BITs limiting arbitral jurisdiction to claims arising from

119
As of April 2011 China has signed five FTAs: with Chile in 2005 (no
Chapter on Investments), with Pakistan in 2006 (Investment Chapter 9), with
New Zealand in 2008 (Investment Chapter 11), with Singapore in 2008 (no
Chapter on Investments but refers to the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement
which is incorporated into and forms an integral part of the China-Singapore
FTA), with Costa Rica in 2010 (Investment Chapter 11), see FTAs texts
available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml
120
Agreement Between the Government of the United Mexican States
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Beijing, July 11, 2008 (“China-Mexico
BIT”) Art. 11 (Chapter II “Protection to Investment” contains provides for six
substantial protections, national treatment (Article 3), most favored national
treatment (Article 4), minimum standard of treatment (Article 5), compensation
for losses (Article6), expropriation and compensation (Article 7), transfers
(Article 8)).
121
Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People’s
Republic of China and the Government of New Zealand, Beijing, April 27,
2008 (“China – New Zealand FTA”) Art. 152 Ch. 11, available at
http://gjs.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/200804/1208158780064.pdf.
122
China – ASEAN FTA, supra note 70, art. 14(1), (“This Article shall
apply to investment disputes between a Party and an investor of another Party
concerning an alleged breach of an obligation of the former Party under Article
4 (National Treatment), Article 5 (Most-Favored-Nation Treatment), Article 7
(Treatment of Investment), Article 8 (Expropriation), Article 9 and Repatriation
of Profits), which causes loss or damage to the investor in relation to its
investment with respect to the management, conduct, operation, or sale or other
disposition of an investment.”); see also Free Trade Agreement between the
Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the
Republic of Singapore, Beijing, October 23, 2008 (“China-Singapore FTA”)
Art. 84(1) (providing “Upon the conclusion of the [ASEAN-China Investment
Agreement], the provisions of that agreement shall, mutatis mutandis, be
incorporated into and form an integral part of this Agreement unless the context
otherwise requires.”), available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.
shtml.
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breaches of the substantive standards of the treaty, 123 and with the
scope of consent to arbitration found under Article 1116 of the NAFTA
Treaty and Article 26(1) of the ECT.124

B. ARTICLE 25(4) OF THE ICSID CONVENTION
The ISCID Convention also allows contracting states to make
“notification of intent concerning classes of disputes” under Article
25(4). Through this notification, contracting states may declare to
ICSID, at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval of the ICSID
convention or at any time thereafter, the “class or classes of disputes
which would or would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of
ICSID.”125 This mechanism allows contracting states to make known
in advance which matters they were willing or not willing to submit to
the jurisdiction of ISCID.126
Some contracting states have notified their intention to exclude
many different types of disputes, such as rationae materiae, narrowing
the scope of consent, providing requirements as to the investment
(permission of the investment required), as to the economic field of the
investment (oil, mineral natural resources, real estate) or to add
procedural requirements (exhaustion of local remedies). On January 7,
1993, China made known pursuant to article 25(4) of the ICSID
Convention that it “would only consider submitting to the jurisdiction
of disputes over compensation resulting from expropriation and
nationalization.”127
As mentioned above, ICSID jurisdiction requires a double consent:
first ratification of the ICSID Convention by the host state, and second,
specific consent between the foreign investor and the host state to
ICSID jurisdiction by inclusion of an ICSID arbitration clause in the
relevant instrument (contract or BIT). The effect of notifications of
intent has been debated. First, it was affirmed that they do not
constitute a reservation to the ICSID Convention. 128 Second, the

123
See SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 532, referring to Article 24 of the
2004 US Model BIT; see also Shan & Gallagher, supra note 11, ¶ 8.49.
124
SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 535.
125
Id. at 921.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
ICSID Convention, Regulations, and Rules, Notifications by
Contracting States, Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the
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question was whether they affect the specific consent under Article
25(1) of the ICSID Convention? Article 25(4) of the ICSID
Convention states that “Such notification shall not constitute the
consent required by paragraph (1).” But does the notification of intent
affect or stand in the way of the specific consent of a party to ICSID
arbitration under a BIT? This issue has arisen both in the context of
BITs providing for a specific consent larger than that contemplated in a
pre-existing notification of intent of the Contracting States and in the
context of notifications of intent aimed at limiting the scope of the
consent offered in preexisting BITs.129 It has been decided that consent
to ICSID arbitration is only subject to specific consent and not to the
notification of intent. Therefore, the wording of a notification does not
constitute consent nor does it stand in the way of consent. 130 Therefore,
China may not claim that its 1993 Notification was a bar to any offer to
ICSID arbitration granting full jurisdiction to ICSID. However, if the
notification of intent serves “purposes of information only” and is
designed to “avoid misunderstanding” and does not have “any direct
legal consequence,”131 the 1993 notification could be used as a
supplementary means of interpretation to “elucidate the parties’ intent”
under the BIT pursuant to article 32 of VCLT.
In Tza, Peru argued that the 1993 notification limited the tribunal’s
jurisdiction. Peru argued that similarity of the terms used in the 1993
notification, on the one hand, and in the consent clause of the ChinaPeru BIT (which provides “dispute involving the amount of
compensation for expropriation” (Article 8(3)), on the other hand,
showed China did not intend to arbitrate the type of dispute brought by
Tza. The argument prompted the tribunal to fully examine the issue.
The arbitral tribunal rejected Peru’s argument:

Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States,
¶ 31 ICSID/15 (April 2006).
129
E.g., News Release, ICSID, Ecuador’s Notification under Article
25(4) of the ICSID Convention (Dec. 4, 2007) (indicating that it would not
consent to ICSID arbitration of disputes pertaining to investments in natural
resources,
such
as
oil,
gas,
and
minerals),
available
at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcment
s&pageName= Announcement9.
130
Id.
131
ICSID Convention, Regulations, and Rules, supra note 1, ¶ 31.
132
Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 165 (Feb. 12, 2007).
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It would be questionable to interpret the consent of
the parties to the BIT under Article 8 thereof based
on the notification which addresses a completely
different treaty such as the ICSID Convention, the
wording whereof does not even constitute the consent
of the PRC to the convention. For these reasons, the
tribunal does not consider that the notification of the
PRC pursuant to Article 25 of the Convention would
invalidate the scope of Article 8 of the BIT when it is
interpreted in accordance with Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention.132

C. INTERPRETATION OF CONSENT CLAUSES
The interpretation of consent clauses, which determine the
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, is subject to international law and
not to the law applicable to the merits of the dispute.133 In ICSID
arbitration, the issue is governed principally by Article 25 rather then
Article 42 of the Convention. 134 The VCLT is commonly used by
arbitral tribunals to interpret the specific provisions of BITs to
determine the parties’ consent.
1.

PRINCIPLES OF TREATY INTERPRETATION AND ROLE OF PRIOR
ARBITRAL AWARDS
(a) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)

Investment treaties like any treaty instrument need to be
interpreted. Some BITs and FTAs provide internal guidance for rules of
interpretation. For example, the China-New Zealand FTA provides
“[f]or the avoidance of doubt, the Parties agree that the provisions of
this Agreement shall be clarified in accordance with the customary
rules of treaty interpretation of public international law.”135
In international law, principles of interpretation have been
developed so as to form a set of maxims of interpretation adopted by
international tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
These customary rules have been codified in the VCLT, which sets out
the law and procedure for the making, operation and termination of a

133

Schreuer, Consent to Arbitration, supra note 81, at 864-66.
SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 248, Fn783.
135
China-New Zealand FTA, supra note 69, at art. 190(3).
134
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treaty. The VCLT was adopted on May 22, 1969 and entered into force
on January 27, 1980.136 Article 31 of the VCTL provides for the three
basic principles of treaty interpretation: good faith, ordinary meaning
of the treaty terms in their context and the treaty’s object and purpose.
Article 32 of the VCTL provides for the use of supplementary means of
interpretation, such as preparatory documents used in the negotiations
leading to the execution of the treaty.137
The rules of interpretation contained in Articles 31 and 32 are
today universally adopted. They have been recognized by the ICJ as
being an accurate statement of customary international law. 138 The
VCTL is commonly used to interpret treaties by the WTO’s dispute
settlement body,139 by arbitral tribunals for the settlement of investment
treaty based disputes,140 as well as applied by domestic courts in the
context of applications to set aside arbitral awards.141

136

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 43.
DUNGAN, supra note 79, at 204-13; accord ANDREW NEWCOMBE &
LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF
TREATMENT 108-19 (Wolters Kluwer Int’l 2009), Thomas Wälde, Interpreting
Investment Treaties: Experience and Examples, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 724 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2009), Christoph
Schreuer, Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment
Arbitration, 3 TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MGMT. 129, Apr. 2006.
138
“These principles are reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which may in many respects be considered
as a codification of existing customary international law on the point.” Case
Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal),
Summary of the Judgment, I.C.J. 220-24 (Nov. 12, 1991); see also Territorial
Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, I.C.J Reports 6, ¶ 41(Feb.
3, 1994); Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United
States), Judgment, I.C.J Reports 161, ¶ 41 (Nov. 6, 2003).
139
“This rule has received its most authoritative and succinct expression
in the [VCTL]… That general rule of interpretation has attained the status of a
rule of customary or general international law.” See Appellate Body Report,
United States: Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline ¶ 20,
WT/DS2/AB/R, (Apr. 29, 1996).
140
Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 80 (Aug. 3, 2004).
141
“A treaty is governed by International law, which includes the rules of
interpretation. The international rules on treaty interpretation are set out in
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention…The rules set out in Articles 31
and 32 of the Vienna Convention have been accepted by the International Court
of Justice as being an accurate statement of customary International law and are
therefore part of English law,” Czech Republic v. European Media Ventures,
137

2011]

THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTOR STATE DISPUTES
AND CHINA: NEW DEVELOPMENTS ON ICSID
JURISDICTION

31

Treaty interpretation by arbitral tribunals begins with reference to
the principles formulated by Articles 31-32 of the VCTL. However,
use of these provisions is not always consistent and reflects different
approaches, such as the textual and the object, purpose and effective
approach (teleological approach). Also, tribunals do not hesitate to
combine these principles or to depart from them by adopting alternative
interpretation methods, such as dictionary definitions, state practice,
travaux preparatoires, effet utile. Some most recent BITs and FTAs,
like the NAFTA Treaty, Article 1131, add that a joint interpretation of
the BIT shall be binding.142
In addition to the Tza decision on jurisdiction, six other decisions
(five published awards and a High Court decision) rendered between
2006 and 2009 have had the occasion to interpret consent clauses
limited to dispute on the amount of the compensation such as the one
found in the China-Peru BIT 1994.143 All of them adopted the VCTL as
a reference for the interpretation of the BIT consent clause.
In Berschader v. The Russian Federation, the Tribunal had to
examine an objection to jurisdiction raised by the Russian Federation.
The Federation claimed that the issue of jurisdiction had to be
considered in light of the applicable Belgium/Luxemburg-Russian
Treaty, Russian Law and generally accepted norms and principles of
international law.144 The arbitral tribunal found that only the VCTL
applied to the issue:
The Tribunal finds that the principle source of law
applicable to the question of the Tribunal’s

[2007] EWHC (Comm) 2851, [2007] 2 C.L.C. 908 (Eng.); see also Ecuador v.
Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co., (2005) EWHC (Comm) 774.
142
See China-Mexico BIT, supra note 120.
143
Berschader v. Russian Federation (Berschader), Arb. Inst. of
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award, Case No. V 080/2004 (Apr. 21,
2006) (involving the Belgium/Luxembourg-Russian BIT of 1989); RosInvest
Co. UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation (RosInvest), Arb. Inst. Of Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, Award on Jurisdiction, Case No. V 079/2005 (Oct.
2007) (involving the UK-Russian BIT of 1989); Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v.
Russian Federation (Renta4), Arb. Inst. of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce,
Award on Preliminary Objections, Case No. V 024/2007 (Mar. 20, 2009)
(involving the Spanish-Russian BIT of 1991); Austrian Airlines v. Slovak
Republic (Austrian Airlines), UNCITRAL, Final Award (Oct. 9, 2009)
(involving the Austrian-Czech BIT of 1990), available at http://italaw.com/
alphabetical_list_content.htm; European Media Ventures, supra note 19.
144
Berschader, ¶ 95-96.
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jurisdiction must be provisions of the Treaty. Insofar
as the terms of the Treaty are unclear or require
interpretation or supplementation, the Vienna
Convention requires the tribunal to consider ‘the
relevant rules of international law applicable in
relations between the parties.’
The Vienna Convention provides no role for the
domestic law of contracting states in the
interpretation of international treaties. Therefore, in
the instant case, it is clear that Russian national law is
of no relevance in that regard. While Russian law
may be relevant in establishing certain factual
circumstances involved in the merits of the case, it
has no role to play in determining the jurisdiction of
the tribunal.145
The Tza tribunal also used the VCTL as a guide for interpretation
of the treaty provisions, and held: “The Vienna Convention on the law
of treaties constitutes the main guide to interpret treaties based in
international law, in particular Articles 31 and 32.”146
It was also the case in Austrian Airlines v. The Slovak Republic,
where the ad-hoc arbitral tribunal, which had to determine whether it
had jurisdiction over the expropriation claim made by the claimant,
found that the VCLT ‘guided’ its interpretation in the review of the
scope of the consent clause (article 8 of the Austria-Czech BIT
1990).147
In RosInvest v. The Russian Federation, the tribunal applied the
VCLT not as customary international law but as a legal obligation of
the Contracting States to the BIT:
[T]he present is one of those cases – surprisingly rare
in practice – in which the Vienna Convention is more
than just a convenient reference point for the rules of
general international law, but is in fact a treaty in
force between the Russian Federation and the United
Kingdom, and which is entered into force before the
IPPA itself was negotiated and concluded. The
145

Id.
Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 38 (Feb. 12, 2007).
147
Austrian Airlines v. Slovak Republic (Austrian Airlines),
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 95 (Oct. 9, 2009).
146

2011]

THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTOR STATE DISPUTES
AND CHINA: NEW DEVELOPMENTS ON ICSID
JURISDICTION

33

consequence is that, under the terms of its Article 4,
the Vienna Convention applies as a matter of legal
obligation to the interpretation and application of the
IPPA.148
The same approach was used in Renta4 v. The Russian Federation.
Article 10 of the applicable Spanish-Russian BIT provided for the
arbitral tribunal to base its decisions on the provisions of the BIT, the
national legislation of the host state, the universally recognized norms
and principles of international law (¶ 5 of the award on jurisdiction). 149
The tribunal found that the BIT “is an international instrument that if
necessary falls to be interpreted in accordance with the Vienna
Convention on the Law of treaties. Both Spain and Russia are parties to
that Convention.”150

(b) Role of Prior Arbitral Awards
An important secondary source of interpretation is also found in
arbitral awards rendered on the same subject.151 The publication of
investment arbitral awards allows arbitrators to take into account earlier
rendered decisions which involve similar fact patterns; e.g. foreign
investment cases subsequent to the Argentina crisis of 1999, or treaty
clauses worded in similar terms such as scope of consent clauses and
MFN clauses. It is also particularly true for the definition of recurrent
concepts such as “investor,” “nationality” and “investment” of Article
25 of the ICSID Convention. Although there is no doctrine of precedent
in international law,152 counsel appearing before international arbitral
tribunals do make reference to and rely on the principles established in
148
RosInvest Co. UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation (RosInvest), Arb. Inst.
Of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award on Jurisdiction, Case No. V
079/2005, ¶ 38 (Oct. 2007).
149
Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation (Renta4), Arb Inst. of
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case
No. V 024/2007 (Mar. 20, 2009).
150
Id. ¶ 15.
151
NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 137, at 101-06; Gabrielle
Kaufmann-Kohler, The 2006 Freshfields Lecture. Arbitral Precedent: Dream,
Necessity or Excuse?,23 ARB. INT’L. 357 (2007); Paulsson, supra note 92, at
241-65; Wälde, supra note 137, at 724.
152
Article 59 of the Statute of the ICJ provides for res judicata and not
precedent: “The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the
parties and in respect of that particular case.” ICSID Convention, Regulations
and Rules, supra note 1, at ¶ 25.
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earlier decisions. Arbitrators then refer to the status to be given to
earlier awards in a special section of the award in the preliminary issues
next to applicable law and undisputed facts, 153 or to outline in the
reasoning of this source of interpretation. 154 Arbitral tribunals
frequently recall at the same time the lack of precedential effect of
earlier cases and the conditions upon which the current case may rely
on or depart from these decisions.
In Berschader, while Russia, the respondent, claimed the case had
to be decided solely on Russian law without recourse to international
law or international case law, the tribunal found international
investment case law to be a “persuasive source of law:”
While such case law and practice is in no way
binding upon the Tribunal or parties, the Tribunal
must, nonetheless, be entitled to consider and take
into account the conclusions of others arbitral
tribunals who have addressed similar issues with
respect to similar treaties and identical provisions.
Moreover, jurisprudence and doctrine emanating
from the decisions of international tribunals and the
works of learned authors is frequently referred to as a
source of international law for the purpose of
interpreting treaty under the Vienna Convention.155
In RosInvest, the tribunal also agreed to give consideration to earlier
decisions:
It is at all events plain that the decisions of other
tribunals are not binding on this Tribunal . . . . This
does not however preclude the Tribunal from
153
The Austrian Airlines tribunal devoted in its General Consideration a
section named “Relevance of Previous Awards and Decisions of other
Tribunals.” Austrian Airlines v. Slovak Republic (Austrian Airlines),
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 83-84 (Oct. 9, 2009).
154
In Tza, the Tribunal outlined the same level of consideration given to
earlier decisions than to articles 31 and 32 VCLT by dividing its discussion on
the scope of the consent clause (Article 8 of the Peru-China BIT) into three
sections respectively devoted to the interpretation in accordance with Article 31
VCLT, in accordance with 32 VCLT and interpretation “based on other arbitral
decisions and awards.” Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/6, Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 173 (Feb. 12,
2007).
155
Berschader v. Russian Federation (Berschader), Arb. Inst. of
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award, Case No. V 080/2004, ¶ 97 (Apr.
21, 2006).
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considering other arbitral decisions and the
arguments of the Parties based upon them, to the
extent that it may find that they throw any useful
light on the issues that arise for decision in this
case.156
The Austrian Airlines tribunal adopted the solution established in
Saipem v Bangladesh on the Tribunal’s “duty to adopt solution
established in a series of consistent cases,” 157 and concluded:
The tribunal considers that it is not bound by
previous decisions. At the same time, it is of the
opinion that it must pay due consideration to earlier
decisions of international tribunal. It believes that,
subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty
to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent
cases. It also believes that, subject to the specifics of
a given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual
case, it has a duty to seek to meet the legitimate
expectations of the community of States and
investors towards certainty of the rule of law. 158
Likewise, the Renta4 tribunal expressed its attentiveness to other
cases brought to its attention by the parties. However, It also expressed
the its desire to reach a decision case by case, rather than enforcing a
duty of making consistent decisions (as in Austrian Airlines above).
Therefore, the tribunal in Renta4 limited the effect of other decisions’
to those constituting “fully reasoned” cases, as opposed to series of
“consistent” cases (as in Austrian Airlines).159
156
RosInvest Co. UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation (RosInvest), Arb. Inst.
Of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award on Jurisdiction, Case No. V
079/2005, ¶ 49 (Oct. 2007).
157
Saipem v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award, ¶ 90
(June, 30, 2009). See also Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi AS v.
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 145 (Aug. 27, 2009).
158
Austrian Airlines, ¶ 83-84.
159
Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, Arb Inst. of Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case No. V
024/2007, ¶ 16 (Mar. 20, 2009), “The present Parties are entitled to a decision
based on the arbitrators’ examination of the facts and arguments presented in
this case. The arbitrators do not in any event operate in a hierarchical and
unitary system which requires them to follow precedent . . . . Moreover they are
inclined to do so on the premise that there is value in considering the reasoning
of decision-makers who have given careful attention to issues similar to those
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In Tza, The application of these principles of interpretation and
prior decisions will be examined infra in light of the scope of the
consent clause and of the MFN clause.

2.

INTERPRETATION OF CONSENT CLAUSES BY ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS

A few decisions have interpreted the limited consent clauses found
in the Russian, Czech and Hungarian and now Chinese BITs by arbitral
tribunals, either ICSID, SCC or ad-hoc in light of the above principles
of interpretation. The subject matter of the arbitration clauses of the
relevant BITs basically covered “disputes on the quantum of an
indemnity” for expropriation. The wording of the provision was in each
case unique but the decisions when compared show two main trends of
interpretation. In three of the cases, Berschader, RosInvest and Austrian
Airlines,160 the arbitral tribunal found that the arbitration clause did not
cover the dispute over entitlement to an indemnity. In three other cases,
European Media Ventures SA, Tza and Renta4,161 the High Court and
the arbitral tribunals respectively, found that the wording of the clause
allowed such examination.
(a) Arbitral tribunals that rejected jurisdiction
In Berschader, the relevant consent clause interpreted by the
arbitral tribunal constituted under the auspices of the SCC covered
“disputes concerning the amount or mode of compensation to be paid
under Article 5 of the present [expropriation, nationalization or other
measures having a similar effect].”162 In RosInvest, the consent clause
provided for “disputes . . . concerning the amount of payment or
that arise here. The arbitrators would be hesitant to depart from a proposition
followed in a series of fully reasoned decisions reflecting jurisprudence
constante.”
160
Berschader v. Russian Federation (Berschader), Arb. Inst. of
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award, Case No. V 080/2004, ¶ 129 (Apr.
21, 2006).
161
Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 188 (Feb. 12, 2007); Renta4, ¶ 28.
162
Berschader, quoting in full Treaty Between the Governments of the
Kingdom of Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Promotion and
Mutual Protection of Investments, Belg.-Lux-U.S.S.R., Feb. 9, 1989, 1996
U.N.T.S. 312 (unofficial English translation). Article 5 provides: “Investments
made by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other
Contracting Party may not be expropriated, nationalized, or subjected to any
other measures having a similar effect.”
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compensation under Article 4 or 5 [expropriation] of this Agreement or
concerning any other matter consequential upon an act of expropriation
in accordance with Article 5 of this Agreement” (Article 8(1) of the
1988 UK-Soviet BIT/IPPA) and the BIT did not provide for a forum
for disputes on liability.163
The reasoning adopted in these three decisions to decline
jurisdiction on the entitlement to an indemnity for expropriation shows
the tribunals search for the ordinary meaning of the clause. Thereafter
the meaning of the terms is explored in the context of the expropriation
clause only. Finally, the tribunals, in support of their primary findings,
use some supplementary means of interpretation such as travaux
preparatoires or treaty practice.
First, the arbitral tribunals affirmed the clarity of the relevant
terms: “The tribunal is of the view that the ordinary meaning of the
[Article being interpreted] is quite clear.”164 They immediately affirm
that the words, based on their ordinary meaning, work as a limitation or
a qualification of the types of dispute contemplated under the
expropriation clause to which they refer. The Berschader tribunal held
that “[t]he wording expressly limits the type of disputes, which may be
subjected to arbitration under the Treaty, to a dispute concerning the
amount or mode of compensation to be paid in the event of an
expropriatory act.”165
Likewise in Austrian Airlines, the arbitrators said:
[The words] mean that only disputes “concerning the
amount or the conditions of payment of a
compensation” can be submitted to arbitration. The
scope of Article 8 is therefore limited to disputes
163

RosInvest Co. UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation (RosInvest), Arb. Inst.
Of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award on Jurisdiction, Case No. V
079/2005, ¶ 57 (Oct. 2007).
164
Berschader, ¶ 152; see also Austrian Airlines, supra note 147, ¶ 96:
“The ordinary meaning of Article 8(1) arises from the words used in that
provision which are clear by themselves.”
165
Berschader, ¶ 152. The use of the ordinary meaning made in
Berschader was criticized in Renta4, as amounting to no analysis: “This is no
more than a restatement of the problem. It is necessary to determine whether
these words exclude disputes over entitlement to compensation (with the effect
of limiting jurisdiction to mere quantification or mode of payment).” Renta 4
S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, Arb Inst. of Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case No. V 024/2007, ¶ 24
(Mar. 20, 2009) (emphasis omitted).
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about the amount of the compensation and does not
extend to the review of the principle of
expropriation.166
Second, the arbitral tribunals interpreted the “ordinary meaning [of
the words] in their context,” by limiting the “context” to the sole
provision of the BIT to which the arbitration clause expressly referred,
the expropriation clause. They made no mention of the treaties “object
and purpose” or of any right of the investor to international arbitration.
Rather they hold that the ordinary meaning of the provision excluded
disputes concerning “whether or not an act of expropriation actually
occurred under Article 5.”167 If such a dispute occurred, this tribunal
believed it would have to be resolved by the dispute procedure agreed
in the contract or in the domestic courts of the host state. 168
In RosInvest, the relevant part of the arbitration clause covered two
subject matters relating to expropriation, namely: (i) “the amount or
payment of compensation under” Articles 4 or 5 of the Agreement
(First Jurisdiction Clause), and (ii) “concerning any other matter
consequential upon an act of expropriation in accordance with Article 5
of this Agreement” (Second Jurisdiction Clause). 169 As to the First
Jurisdiction clause covering “the amount or payment of compensation,”
the RosInvest Tribunal’s analysis was based upon its interpretation of
the reference to Article 5. 170 The tribunal found that the order and the
166

Austrian Airlines v. Slovak Republic (Austrian Airlines),
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 96 (Oct. 9, 2009), see also RosInvest Co. UK Ltd.
v. Russian Federation (RosInvest), Arb. Inst. Of Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce, Award on Jurisdiction, Case No. V 079/2005, ¶ 110-115 (Oct.
2007).
167
Berschader v. Russian Federation (Berschader), Arb. Inst. of
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award, Case No. V 080/2004, ¶ 153 (Apr.
21, 2006).
168
Berschader, ¶ 152–53. Once again this approach was criticized in
Renta 4: “This is a simple affirmation. It does not appear to be supported by
analysis. . . . Words may have an “ordinary meaning” as units of language. It
does not follow that their import is self-evident when viewed in context.”
Renta4, supra note 149, ¶ 25-26.
169
RosInvest, ¶ 110-115 (quoting Article 8.1 of the UK-Russian BIT).
170
Id. ¶ 111–12. Article 5(1) of the UK-Russian BIT provided
“Investments of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be nationalized,
expropriated or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to
nationalization or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as “expropriation”) in
the territory of the other Contracting Party except for a purpose which is in the
public interest and is not discriminatory and against the payment, without
delay, of adequate and effective compensation. Such compensation shall
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wording of the expropriation clause in Article 5, introducing
compensation in the second half of the provision and as the last of
three exceptions to the principle that an investment cannot
expropriated, supported their interpretation of the limitation of
jurisdictional clause.171

39
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As to the Second Jurisdiction Clause, the RosInvest tribunal also
concluded that “any other matter consequential upon an act of
expropriation” had to exclude entitlement to compensation. 172
Focusing on the word “consequential,” the tribunal found the clause
could not sensibly be read to include “expropriation” claims or it would
render “these preconditions … meaningless.” 173
The Austrian Airlines tribunal’s use of the expropriation clause
(Article 4(4) and 4(5) of the Austrian-Slovak BIT) to confirm the
context of the arbitration clause to interpret its ordinary meaning may
have been prompted by the particular wording of the expropriation
clause and reference to the “unmistakable meaning of Articles 8 and
4.”174 The expropriation clause under Article 4 contained a cross
reference to the arbitration clause (Article 8), while this was not the
case in the two above mentioned Russian BITs where only the
arbitration clause referred to the expropriation clause. The tribunal also
noted that Article 4(4) provided for a forum choice before state courts
for disputes relating to the “‘legitimacy’ of the expropriation,” whereas
Article 4(5) gave the investor a choice to challenge the amount of
compensation before either a local court or an arbitral tribunal: “Claims
about the principle of expropriation are for the local authorities under
Article 4(4) and claims about the amount of compensation are for the
local authorities or for an arbitral tribunal under Articles 4(5) and 8.”175
Third, the awards do not use the ‘object and purpose’ of the BIT to
construe the interpretation of the intent of the parties. Instead, they
make extensive use of contextual documents, such as travaux
preparatoires and treaty practice. Under Article 32 of the VCLT,
travaux preparatoires constitute a supplementary means of
amount to the real value of the investment expropriated immediately before the
expropriation or before the impending expropriation became public
knowledge….” (Emphasis added).
171
Id.
172
Id. ¶ 115–16.
173
Id.
174
Austrian Airlines v. Slovak Republic (Austrian Airlines),
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 110 (Oct. 9, 2009).
175
Id. ¶ 97-98.
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interpretation used to confirm the meaning resulting from the primary
means of interpretation (Article 31 of the VCLT), or when the meaning
is ambiguous or obscure; or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd
or unreasonable.176 As noted above, travaux preparatoires were used in
Austrian Airlines in support of the Tribunal’s findings:
The tribunal’s conclusions are further supported by
the travaux preparatoires of the treaty. The
negotiation history shows that the final wording of
Article 8 is the result of a process by which the scope
of the disputes subject to arbitration was purposefully
restricted … one can only deduct from this sequence
of texts that the Contracting States deliberately
narrowed down the initially broad scope of arbitral
disputes.177
In Berschader, as noted in the award, the arbitral tribunal was not
provided with travaux preparatoires, but it also refused to give weight
to the Belgian MFA’s explanatory statement on the Belgium-Soviet
BIT prepared for the purpose of the ratification of that treaty by the
Belgian Parliament.178 In that document, the consent clause was
defined as an arbitration clause that covered all disputes over
expropriation.179 The tribunal refused to explore this document based
on the finding that “the language of the treaty [was] quite clear and in
the view of the Tribunal such language could not possibly lend itself to
the interpretation suggested in the explanatory statement.” 180 Indeed,
as noted by commentators, caution is required with “unilateral
statements” in the ratification process.181 Nevertheless, “ratification
176
See Christoph Schreuer, Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty
Interpretation in Investment Arbritation 18 (Feb. 7, 2006), available at
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/cspubl_85.pdf. See also Walde, supra note
127, at 777: “In practice, the travaux are as unreliable in deciding difficult
interpretation issues as they are always invoked if they appear to helpful to
counsel or tribunal.”
177
Austrian Airlines, ¶ 105–07.
178
Berschader v. Russian Federation (Berschader), Arb. Inst. of
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award, Case No. V 080/2004, ¶ 158 (Apr.
21, 2006).
179
Id.
180
Austrian Airlines v. Slovak Republic (Austrian Airlines),
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 105-07 (Oct. 9, 2009).
181
See Christoph Schreuer, Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty
Interpretation in Investment Arbitration, supra note 17, at 18; see also Walde,
supra note 137, at 778, “as they may simply record a view of an ambiguous
text by one delegation, which is not shared by the others; it may even involve
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memoranda tend to paint a particular innocuous view of the treaty in
order not to wake up sleeping wolves during ratification.”182
Furthermore, assuming the Berschader tribunal’s decision was based
on a conservative application of Article 32 VCLT, implying that the
use of supplementary means of interpretation, such as an explanatory
statement, may arise only where the clause in ambiguous, one may
wonder why the same tribunal needed to use state practice with third
parties, something that is not even a mean of interpretation
contemplated in the VCLT. The decision of the Berschader tribunal
shows that supplementary means of interpretations are excluded when
they alter the tribunal’s interpretation of the ordinary meaning and are
adopted only when they confirm it.
The Berschader and RosInvest tribunals both interpreted the treaty
in light of the current and subsequent treaty practice of the host state,
Russia, with third countries (France, UK and Canada) in order to
outline a change of policy that confirmed their interpretation:
[T]he majority of these early BITs illustrate an
identifiable practice on the part of the Soviet Union,
which corresponds with the policy considerations
alleged by the Respondent to lie behind the restrictive
wording of Article 10 of the Treaty. Moreover, it is
interesting to note that a the definite change of policy
can be observed in the BITs concluded by the
Russian Federation in the late 1990s subsequent to
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The arbitration
clauses in these later BITs are generally much
broader in their scope and, undoubtedly, encompass
disputes concerning the occurrence of an act of
expropriation. This further indicates that the
restrictive wording of Article 10 arose from the

an attempt by a delegation to achieve by unilateral interpretative conduct what
they did not obtain by negotiation.” See also the ad-hoc decision in Malaysian
Historical Salvors SDN BHD v. Government of Malaysia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment, ¶ 57 (Apr. 16, 2009)
“In any event, courts and tribunal interpreting treaties regularly review the
travaux preparatoires whenever they are brought to their attention; it is
mythological to pretend that they are brought to their attention; it is
mythological to pretend that they do so only when they first conclude that the
term requiring interpretation is ambiguous or obscure.”
182
Walde, supra note 137, at 724.
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deliberate intention of the Contracting Parties to limit
the scope of arbitration.183
As noted by authors, tribunals have repeatedly looked at other
BITs in interpreting the treaty in question as they “can shed light on the
meaning of a term or the function of a treaty mechanism.” 184 However,
the use of treaty practice with other parties, as opposed to state practice
between the treaty parties as contemplated under Article 31(2) of the
VCLT, to ascertain state policies denies the simple fact revealed by
their examination: every BIT is unique and the result of a particular
negotiation that renders state practice with other states irrelevant for the
purpose of ascertaining the meaning of that BIT. Indeed, the variety of
wording in limited wide consent clauses shows it is hard to ascertain
the same consequences from similarities identified in other treaties but
taken out of context.185 This will be seen below in the three cases that
accepted jurisdiction.

(b) Arbitral tribunals that have accepted jurisdiction
In European Media Ventures, the English High Court examined an
application to set aside an award, pursuant to section 67(1)(a) of the
English Arbitration Act 1996, made by the Czech Republic on the
grounds that the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction. In its ad-hoc
award on jurisdiction made in London, the arbitral tribunal had to
construe the scope of consent clause of the Belgian/Luxembourg-Czech
BIT 1989 providing for disputes “concerning compensation due by
virtue of article 3 paragraphs (1) and (3) [expropriation].” 186 It had
found that such scope was not limited to issues of quantification.

183

Berschader v. Russian Federation (Berschader), Arb. Inst. of
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award, Case No. V 080/2004, ¶ 155 (Apr.
21, 2006).
184
See Walder, supra note 137, at 767.
185
See Mox Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), ITLOS Case No. 10, Order ¶ 51
(Dec. 3, 2001); see also RosInvest Co. UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation
(RosInvest), Arb. Inst. Of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award on
Jurisdiction, Case No. V 079/2005, ¶ 39 (Oct. 2007).
186
Id. at ¶ 8. The opinion noted that “[t]he Tribunal provided its
interpretation of that limitation as follows: ‘It would seem to exclude from that
jurisdiction any claim for relief other than compensation (e.g. a claim for
restitution or a declaration that a contract was still in force).’” Id. at ¶ 9. The
Award on Jurisdiction rendered on May 15, 2007 in London under the
UNCITRAL arbitration Rules is not published.
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The Renta4 tribunal had to examine the scope of the SpanishRussian BIT consent clause which covered disputes “relating to the
amount or method of payment of the compensation due under Article 6
(nationalization, expropriation) of this Agreement.” 187 The Tza tribunal
had to construe the scope of the Peru-China BIT consent clause which
covered “disputes involving the amount of compensation for
expropriation.”188 Under Article 8 of the Peru-China BIT, the
contracting states had agreed that any dispute connected with an
investment be examined by the state courts of the host state 189 and
added that (i) disputes involving the amount of compensation for
expropriation be submitted to ICSID, and (ii) any other disputes
concerning other matters be submitted to ICSID subject to the parties’
agreement.190 The reasoning adopted in these three cases to retain
jurisdiction on the entitlement to an indemnity for expropriation shows
the search of an ordinary meaning based on a textual approach and in
light of the expropriation clause but also the purpose and object of the
treaty. Additionally, the tribunal referred to travaux preparatoires and
prior decisions.
First, these tribunals took a cautious step by departing from the
view that the wording of the provision was clear or introduced a
limitation. The Tza tribunal first recalled that communist regimes were
generally not familiar with independent tribunals and that this implied a
“certain degree of distrust”191 which created a conflict between the
positions of the negotiating parties to the consent clause and therefore
some ambiguity.192 A virtually identical reasoning was applied by the
tribunal in European Media Ventures, where another former socialist
country was a signatory to the BIT.193 The compromise created an
ambiguity:

187

Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, Arb Inst. of Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case No. V
024/2007, ¶ 5 (Mar. 20, 2009), citing Spanish-Russian BIT, Art. 10.
188
Peru-China BIT, supra note 12, at art. 8(3).
189
Id. at art. 8(2).
190
Id. at art. 8(3).
191
Mox Plant, ¶ 145.
192
Id. ¶ 149. As noted above the Renta4 tribunal refuted the assumption
of a limited scope derived from the reading of the consent clause: “words may
have an ‘ordinary meaning’ as units of language. It does not follow that their
import is self-evident when viewed in context.” Renta4, ¶ 26.
193
See Czech Republic v. European Media Ventures, [2007] EWHC
(Comm) 2851, [2007] 2 C.L.C. 908 (Eng.).
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In the present case each side appears to have adopted
opposing negotiating positions, and there was a
degree of compromise. In my view the arbitration
provision of this Treaty fell into a further category, in
which the width of the arbitration clause was left
unclear: possibly to the satisfaction of both sides. 194
Second, in all three cases the textual approach to interpret the
ordinary meaning of the term in their context was adopted by the
arbitral tribunals. For example, in European Media Ventures, the Court
held:
It is clear that the proper approach to the
interpretation of Treaty wording is to identify what
the words mean in their context (the textual method),
rather than attempting to identify what may have
been the underlying purpose in the use of the words
(the teleological method).195
Similar terms were used in Renta 4, “[w]ords may have an
'ordinary meaning' as units of language. It does not follow that their
import is self-evident when viewed in context.”196
This approach to analyzing treaty language resulted in a broad
interpretation of the consent clause. The terms of the arbitration clause
were interpreted in their context and not in the context of the
expropriation clause to which they nevertheless all refer. In utilizing
this textual approach, the tribunals used the dictionary to interpret and
weight the surrounding terms used in the clause, such as “involving the
amount of compensation for expropriation,” 197 “concerning
compensation due by virtue of ”198 or “compensation due under . . .
.”199 European Media Ventures noted the tension between the wide
meaning of these surrounding terms, on the one hand, and the limiting
sense of the term compensation, on the other hand. The High Court
194

Id. ¶ 32.
Id. ¶ 16.
196
Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, Arb Inst. of Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case No. V
024/2007, ¶ 26 (Mar. 20, 2009).
197
Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 129 (Feb. 12, 2007). Note in ¶ 151
the use of the Oxford Dictionary to conclude ‘involving’ means “include” with
no restriction thereto.
198
European Media Ventures, ¶ 44-45.
199
Renta4, ¶ 19.
195
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nevertheless decided that the combination did not preclude them from
hearing the preconditions to quantum, and found:
The use of the word ‘compensation’ limits the scope
of the arbitration. It may be contrasted with broad
phrases such as ‘any disputes’ which may be found in
other BITs. Its impact is to restrict the jurisdiction of
the tribunal to one aspect of expropriation. The word
‘concerning,’ however, is broad. The word is not
linked to any particular aspect of ‘compensation.’
‘Concerning’ is similar to other common expressions
in arbitration clauses, for example ‘relating to’ and
‘arising out of.’ Its ordinary meaning is to include
every aspect of its subject: in this case ‘compensation
due by virtue of Paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article 3.’
As a matter of ordinary meaning this covers issues of
entitlement as well as quantification.200
The tribunal’s jurisdiction is therefore not limited by the reference
to the expropriation clause in which the consent clause refers to
quantum, but instead to all events contemplated by the expropriation
clause. In particular, in European Media Ventures, the arbitration
clause was referred to in Articles (3) and (1) of the BIT,201 the High
Court found that all of the elements within the scope of Article (3) and
(1) of the BIT were included in the international tribunal’s
jurisdiction.202

200
Czech Republic v. European Media Ventures, ¶ 44 [2007] EWHC
(Comm) 2851, [2007] 2 C.L.C. 908 (Eng.).
201
European Media Ventures, ¶ 6 (“Article 3(1): Investments made by
investors of one of the Contracting Parties in the territory of the other
Contracting Party may not be expropriated or subjected to other measures of
direct or indirect dispossession, total or partial, having a similar effect, unless
such measures are:
(a) taken in accordance with a lawful procedure and are not
discriminatory;
(b) accompanied by provisions for the payment of compensation, which
shall be paid to the investors in convertible currency and without delay. The
amount shall correspond to the real value of the investments on the day before
the measures were taken or made public. . . .
Article 3(3): The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 are applicable to
investors of each Contracting Party, holding any form of participation in any
company whatsoever in the territory of the other Contracting Party.”).
202
European Media Ventures, ¶ 41.
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In Renta4, Russia’s argument was that the words “amount or
method of payment” in the consent clause (Article 10 of the BIT)
allowed nothing but a narrow debate about quantum, timing, or
currency of the compensation for expropriation. It further alleged that
the word “due” meant that the dispute before the arbitrators was limited
to amounts already established as “due” by a final decision,
acknowledging that there has been a compensable event as defined in
Article 6 (the expropriation clause). The tribunal refuted this
interpretation:
The Tribunal does not believe that the text allows a
curtailment of the international tribunal’s authority to
decide whether compensation is “due”. That perforce
entrains the power to determine whether there has
been a compensable event in the first place . . . .
Article 6 defines the precondition of compensation
being “due” for the purpose of Article 10. It is an
aspect of Article 6 which cannot be beyond the
arbitrators reach.203
The same construction as in European Media Ventures lead the
Renta4 tribunal to a somehow narrower subject-matter jurisdiction
given a concession made by the Claimants in the course of the
proceedings: the subject matter jurisdiction did not cover all aspects of
compensation but compensation only. 204 It did not extend to all aspects
of expropriation. The Tribunal therefore decided that the reference to
203

See Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, Arb Inst. of
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case
No. V 024/2007, ¶ 28 (Mar. 20, 2009). Article 6 of the Spain-Russian BIT
provides: “Any nationalization, expropriation or any other measures having
similar consequences taken by the authorities of either party against
investments made within its territory by investors of the other party, shall be
taken only on the grounds of public use and in accordance with the legislation
in force in the territory. Such measures should on no account be discriminatory.
The Party adopting such measures shall pay the investor or his beneficiary
adequate compensation, without undue delay and in freely convertible
currency.”
204
The arbitrators are not asked to determine whether Russia has acted
discriminatorily or without the justification of public purpose. Nor would they
be entitled to do so given the Claimant’s concession (see paragraph 42 above).
It is unnecessary to consider issues that might have arisen of this concession
had not been made. (A familiar feature of this area of international law is
precisely the proposition that the lawfulness or otherwise of a measure of
dispossession may affect the amount of compensation.)
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“compensation due under article 6” allowed its subject-matter
jurisdiction to cover the last sentence of Article 6 only, namely: “The
Party adopting such measures shall pay the investor or his beneficiary
adequate compensation, without undue delay and in freely convertible
currency,” i.e., whether there had been a “compensable
expropriation.”205 The tribunal excluded from its jurisdiction the first
two sentences of Article 6, which concern justification of expropriation
for public purpose and discrimination, respectively.206
Third, the object, purpose, and effectiveness approaches, which
had not been discussed in the above awards rejecting jurisdiction, were
used in Tza as well as in the two other arbitral decisions to reaffirm the
tribunal’s findings using the textual interpretation.207 In Tza, and in the
two other cases, the tribunal found that the object and purpose, by
reference to the preamble of the treaty (purpose of conferring certain
benefits to promote investments), and to the perception of the benefit of
BITs by the foreign investor, extended entitlement to ICSID arbitration,
internationalization of the dispute, or conferring a valuable right to
arbitrate. In European Media Ventures, the High Court found:
In these circumstances it seems it seems to me plain
that in interpreting a BIT the Court is entitled to take
into account that one of the objects of the treaty was
to confer rights on an investor, including a valuable
right to arbitrate. If the suggestion made in Ecuador
v. Occidental (No.2) at §28, that it is permissible to
resolve uncertainties in the interpretation of a BIT in
favor of an investor, who is not a party to the treaty,
is said to amount to a rule of interpretation, the
suggestion goes rather further than appears to be
justified in International law.208
The Tza tribunal also referred to the inclusion of the entitlement to
submit certain disputes to ICSID arbitration as an intention to confer
certain benefits to promote investments. 209 The Renta4 tribunal did the
same, holding that investment is not promoted by purely formal or
205

Renta4, ¶ 63.
Renta4, ¶ 46.
207
Czech Republic v. European Media Ventures, ¶ 48 [2007] EWHC
(Comm) 2851, [2007] 2 C.L.C. 908 (Eng.).
208
European Media Ventures, ¶ 23.
209
Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 39 (Feb. 12, 2007).
206
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illusory standards of protection. A fundamental advantage perceived by
investors in “BITs is that of the internationalization of the host state’s
commitments.” The tribunal said the “dispute would not be
internationalized if the respondent State could simply declare whether
there is an obligation to compensate for expropriation.” 210
What also follows from this interpretation is the principle of effet
utile. Not only is international arbitration within the ambit of the treaty
guaranties, but its protection must also carry some weight, it must not
lead to an “incoherent conclusion, namely that investor would never
have access to arbitration.”211
The interest in the effectiveness reasoning adopted in Tza resides
in the wording of the dispute resolution of the China-Peru BIT 1994,
which included a fork in the road clause. The consent clause is divided
into three paragraphs: Article 8(1) provided for amicable settlement
through consultation,212 Article 8(2) called for litigation in the host
state courts, i.e., Peruvian courts in the present case. 213 Finally, Article
8(3) introduced the access to international arbitration in three
sentences: (a) ICSID arbitration for disputes “involving the amount of
compensation for expropriation,” (b) ICSID arbitration, subject to the
parties’ agreement, for disputes concerning other matters, and (c)
ICSID arbitration was excluded if the investor has had recourse to
litigation in the host state courts. This last sentence (c) contained the
fork in the road clause, and provided: “The provisions of this Paragraph
shall not apply if the investor concerned has resorted to the procedure
specified in Paragraph 2 of this Article [state courts].” 214
Peru’s position was that access to ICSID arbitration under Article
8(3) was limited to disputes concerning the quantum of the
compensation for expropriation under sentence (a) above. It claimed
210

Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, Arb Inst. of Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case No. V
024/2007, ¶ 56 (Mar. 20, 2009).
211
Tza, ¶ 154.
212
China-Peru BIT, supra note 12, at art. 8(1) (“Any dispute between an
investor of one Contracting Party and the other Contracting Party in connection
with an investment in the territory of the other Contracting Party shall, as far as
possible, be settled amicably through negotiations between the parties to the
dispute.”).
213
Id. at art. 8(2) (“If the dispute cannot be settled through negotiations
within six months, either party to the dispute shall be entitled to submit this
dispute to the competent court of the Contracting Party accepting the
investment.”).
214
Id. art. 8(3).
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that since the parties had not agreed to submit the dispute over
entitlement to compensation to ICSID arbitration under sentence (b)
above, the treaty called for litigation in the Peruvian courts (Article
8(2)) to solve the dispute over entitlement to compensation. 215 The
ICSID tribunal found that this three-step reading of the clause
employed by Peru when compared with the reading of sentence (c)
above led to an incoherent conclusion: recourse to state courts by the
foreign investor, under sentence (c), prevents the application of the
provisions of Article 8(3), and therefore precludes recourse to ICSID
arbitration.216 The tribunal found that this last sentence (c) created a
final choice of jurisdiction for the investors and amounted to a fork in
the road, thus preventing subsequent recourse to ICSID arbitration as
per (a). Should disputes over the entitlement to compensation be
brought by an investor before State courts pursuant to Article 8(2), the
fork in the road clause triggered an irrevocable choice not allowing any
subsequent recourse to ICSID arbitration.217 Balancing the narrow
interpretation of the scope of the clause sustained by Peru and the effect
of the fork in the road clause preventing the internationalization of the
dispute, the tribunal concluded that this was an “incoherent
conclusion.”218 The principle of effectiveness, guided by the concern
that the state’s promise of ICSID arbitration had to carry weight and
could not be read as strictly denying any access to arbitration, led the
ICSID tribunal to reject the textual approach alleged by Peru and to opt
for a large interpretation of the scope of the consent clause. 219
Fourth, all of the tribunals’ decisions refer to travaux preparatoires
in aid of their conclusion. While questioning their relevance for the
purpose of treaty interpretation in some instances, 220 the tribunals still
215

Tza, ¶ 147.
Tza, ¶ 147-54.
217
Id.
218
Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 154 (Feb. 12, 2007).
219
Tza, ¶ 159.
220
Czech Republic v. European Media Ventures, ¶ 31 [2007] EWHC
(Comm) 2851, [2007] 2 C.L.C. 908 (Eng.), (“It seems to me that the court or
tribunal's task is to interpret the Treaty rather than to interpret the
supplementary means of interpretation. If the material relied on is unclear or
equivocal it is unlikely to confirm or determine a meaning.” “As already noted
above, the task of the Court is not to search for a notional common intention;
but to give a meaning to the words used in the context in which they came to be
agreed.”); Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, Arb Inst. of Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case No. V
216
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used them to validate the adopted interpretation.221 Echoing the
decisions, and in a complete opposite ratio to RosInvest and
Berschader, the tribunals examined both travaux preparatoires as
contextual documents, and the Soviet and the Czech state practice. The
tribunals found these texts were unclear and inconsistent, and therefore
non-conclusive for the purpose of interpreting the intent of a limited
consent. In European Media Ventures, the High Court found:
In the present case each side appears to have adopted
opposing negotiating positions, and there was a
degree of compromise. In my view the arbitration
provision of this Treaty fell into a further category, in
which the width of the arbitration clause was left
unclear: possibly to the satisfaction of both sides. I
would add that I did not find material in which
commentators sought to describe and explain the
terms of the Treaty, by way of précis, to be of any
significant assistance in the task of interpretation. 222
The Renta4 tribunal referred to the Russian participation
mentioned previously in Berschader and to a paper on BITs published
by one of the Russian negotiators. The tribunal found that both sources
were silent on the central issue before the arbitrators: the issue of the
arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine whether there had been an
expropriation.223 However, it also said a series of BITs signed by the
USSR in the years of perestroika, shortly before the dissolution of the
Union, may be seen as a divergence from past socialist dogma which
signaled the USSR’s acceptance of an international regime intended to
reassure investors.224

024/2007, ¶ 20 (Mar. 20, 2009). , (“The premise that one may consider the
intention of one of the parties to a BIT is questionable in the first place.”).
221
Tza, ¶ 162 (“To dispel any doubts, the Tribunal has also sought
guidance in supplementary interpretation means as authorized by Article 32,
including preparatory works of the BIT and the circumstances surrounding its
conclusion”); Renta4, ¶ 46 (“The textual approach above is sufficient to decide
the issue at hand. There is strictly speaking no need to consider whether
extraneous considerations confirm the conclusion. Nevertheless, the Tribunal
believes it appropriate to explain why it finds that both evidence of the
purported intentions of the parties and inferences as to object and purpose of
the Spanish BIT validate the arbitrators’ conclusion”).
222
European Media Ventures, ¶ 32.
223
Renta4, ¶ 49-51.
224
Id.
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What was contemplated by commentators in view of the nature of
early Chinese BITs was a test of the scope of these consent clauses
before ICSID arbitration where China, as the host state, and respondent
would challenge the international tribunal’s subject matter
jurisdiction.225 In Tza, the host state was not the contracting party that
asserted a national policy of a limited scope of consent state; instead,
Peru had offered a consent clause covering all disputes during the
negotiation. As noted in the award, the wording that appears in the
China-Peru BIT 1994 had been prompted and drafted by the Chinese
negotiators who had rejected Peru’s proposal of a wide consent clause
as evidenced by the exchange between the negotiators.226 In the context
of a south-south investment emanating from a Chinese investor, Peru
was in a bataille a front renverse, relying on the restrictive state
practice of the other contracting state. The tribunal found that both the
Chinese negotiators’ reply and China’s practice of BITs, although
revealing a restrictive practice, were not able to clearly assert that the
consent was indeed limited to disputes involving only the amount of
compensation for expropriation or involving any issue on
expropriation.227
Finally, we examine the role of prior decisions on consent clauses.
Tza and Renta4 focus their analysis on Berschader, RosInvest and
European Media Ventures.228 Both tribunals use prior awards to
address the national policy and the parties’ intent arguments of
Berschader and RosInvest; they also compare the interpretation of the
consent clause in Berschader and European Media Ventures. Also,
while the Tza tribunal seems to have compiled and used all decisions
available on narrow consent clauses, the Renta4 tribunal, first examined
225
Monika C E. Heymann, International Law and the Settlement of
Investment Disputes relating to China, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW 11(3), 507-526 (2008); Kim M. Rooney, ICSID and BIT Arbitrations and
China, 24 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 24(6) 689-712 (2007);
Stephan W. Schill, Tearing down the Great Wall: the New Generation
Investment Treaties of the People’s Republic of China, CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 73-118 (2007); Peter J. Turner, Investor-State Arbitration, in
MANAGING BUSINESS DISPUTES IN TODAY’S CHINA – DUELLING WITH DRAGONS,
233-258, Kluwer Law International ed. 2007.
226
Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 170 (Feb. 12, 2007).
227
Id. ¶ 171-72.
228
The Tza decision devoted an entire section to other awards at the end
of its reasoning, while the Renta4 decision integrated the decisions in its
reasoning.
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the weight of Berschader and RosInvest and determined those two
cases do not carry any stare decisis. None of the awards were decided
on jurisdiction solely based on a narrow scope of the consent clause. As
noted by the Renta4 tribunal, in Berschader the tribunal had already
reached the decision to decline jurisdiction based on the lack of direct
investment on the part of the claimants before examining the consent
issue.229 In RosInvest, the tribunal declined jurisdiction on the scope of
the consent clause but retained jurisdiction on the MFN clause. 230
Referring to Berschader and RosInvest’s findings on the reflection
of a “national policy,” the Tza tribunal departed to reach the conclusion
that nothing allowed them to interpret the narrow consent clause as a
reflection of the intent of the parties and a national policy of communist
countries:
[T]he tribunal in Berschader maintained that ‘the
restrictive wording (of Article 10) arose from the
deliberate intention of the Contracting Parties to
limit the scope of the arbitration under the Treaty’
(emphasis added).
The Tribunal seems to reach such conclusion by
comparing the wording of the BIT in question with
that of posterior treaties and by so doing infers the
purpose of the wording in the Belgium/Luxembourg
– USSR BIT. We find in the award no other
indication that the parties had such an intention nor
any clear statement of policy of either party proving
such intention.
Similarly, in RosInvest Respondent argued that it
seemed that certain aspects of the national policy of
the former Soviet Union should be considered as a
determining factor of what it may agree or not in
229

Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, Arb Inst. of Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case No. V
024/2007, ¶ 23 (Mar. 20, 2009). (“The impact of Berschader’s consideration of
this point [consent clause] is attenuated by the fact that its conclusion was
superfluous . . . . [The arbitrators’] conclusion was that there was no
jurisdiction with respect to the claimants’ indirect investment. The door had
therefore already been shut on the claimants by the time the arbitrators next
turned to consider the phrase ‘amount or mode of compensation’. Their
conclusions in this regard may be considered obiter.”).
230
Id. ¶ 48 (“It is also noteworthy that the tribunal at any rate found that
it had jurisdiction on another ground (MFN)”).
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specific bilateral treaties. The Award, however, does
not prove that Respondent has produced tangible
evidence of such national policies. In any case, the
Tribunal seems to have placed little importance to
these arguments.231
The Renta4 tribunal was also skeptical of considering the
intentions of one of the parties to a BIT. They found no evidence that
the policy of the Soviet Union was consistent in the various BITs
concluded during that period. They also found no evidence of official
Spanish comment directly on point.232
Equally interesting, the Tza and Renta4 tribunals lean on the
absence of objection from the host state. In those cases, involving
narrow consent clauses, (Telenor v Hungary and Saipem v Bangladesh
the consent clause was limited to expropriation claims) the Tribunals
question the existence of such a national policy:
Surprisingly, none of these awards analyze the
alleged national policy arguments. On the contrary,
as in the famous mystery that was solved with the
clue of the ‘dog that had not barked,’ it seems that
none of the governments (two of which, Hungary and
Russia, were communist states) had even tried to
argue that the expressions ‘involving compensation’
or ‘involving the amount of compensation’
established public policies and the parties' intention
to exclude all legal issues related to expropriation
from the consent to international arbitration. Had the
restrictive interpretation been the result of a policy
deeply enrooted (and presumably hard to negotiate),
it would have been unlikely that the involved
governments had decided not to discuss it. 233
In Tza and Renta4 the tribunals criticise Berschader’s analysis, or
lack of analysis, in interpreting the consent clause. In particular, it is
not decisive in the Tza tribunal’s view that the enlargement of the scope
from “dispute on the amount of compensation” to “any dispute” in
subsequent treaties helps to explain, in retrospect, the nuance of the

231

Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 174-75 (Feb. 12, 2007).
232
Renta4, ¶ 51-53.
233
Tza, ¶ 176.
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meaning of “amount of the compensation” differently than “any issue
on compensation including entitlement.” 234
These findings should be approved. While there was a change in
the wording of the consent clause in Chinese BIT to enlarge it from
“dispute on the amount of compensation” to “any dispute,” such a
change cannot itself constitute sufficient proof to restrict in retrospect
the meaning of “dispute on the amount to compensation” and exclude
the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. However, the comparison of the
wording of consent clauses contained in other treaties signed by the
host state becomes significantly more relevant when the investor seeks
the application of those clauses by means of the most favored nation
clause mechanism.

D. MOST FAVORED NATION CLAUSE AND JURISDICTIONAL EXTENSION
BITs frequently contain most favored nation (MFN) clauses.
These terms are to ensure that the host state does not discriminate
among nationals of different countries. These clauses require the host
state to treat a foreigner from one country no less favorably than it
treats foreigners from another country under their separate BITs. If the
host state provides better treatment to other foreigner investors, it must
increase the level of treatment to all foreigners no matter that their BIT
may have more restrictive terms.
MFN clauses are found in international trade treaties dating back to
the 18th Century.235 Their scopes vary and are subject to interpretation.
The subject matter of the state’s duty may extend to provide
“treatment” no less favorable than, or it may be limited to “activities”
in connection with the investment. 236 It may also be limited to the
234

Tza, ¶ 185.
Treaty of the Bogue, China – Gr. Brit, art. VIII, Oct. 8, 1843 (“The
Emperor of China having been graciously pleased to grant, to all foreign
countries, whose Subjects, or Citizens, have hitherto traded at Canton the
privilege of resorting for purposes of Trade to the other, four Ports of Fuchow,
Amoy, Ningpo and Shanghai, on the same terms as the English, it is further
agreed, that should the Emperor hereafter, from any cause whatever, be pleased
to grant, additional privileges or immunities to any of the subjects or Citizens
of such Foreign Countries, the same privileges and immunities will be extended
to and enjoyed by British Subject. . . .” )
236
See Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Ger.- China, art. 3.2, 3.2, Dec. 1, 2003, 2362 U.N.T.S. 253
(stating that each contracting party shall accord to investments and activities
associated with such investments by the investors of the other Contracting
235
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treatment of investors after the admission of the investment, or extend
to admission and establishment of the investment. 237 It may cover “all
matters,” or an enumerative list of “matters” under the BIT.238 For
instance, in the UK-China BIT the MFN clause covers “treatment” in
general:
Investments by investors of either Contracting State
in the Territory of the other Contracting State shall
not be subjected to a treatment less favorable than
that accorded to investments by investors of third
States.239
In the Peru-China 1994 BIT, the scope of the MFN clause was
limited to the guarantee of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ (FET) and
provided:
1. Investments and activities associated with
investments of investors of either Contracting Party
shall be accorded fair and equitable treatment and
shall enjoy protection in the territory of the other
Contracting Party.
2. The treatment and protection referred to in para. 1
of this article shall not be less favorable than that
accorded to investments and activities associated
with such investment of investors of a third state. 240
The identification of the protections that can be included in the
terms ‘treatment and protection’ has been the subject of extensive
investment tribunal jurisprudence for the last ten years. While the
Party treatment not less favorable than that accorded to investments and
activities by its own investors or investors of any third State); Agreement on
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China- Neth., art.
3.3, Nov. 26, 2001, 2369 U.N.T.S. 219.
237
China does not grant any treatment before admission and approval.
238
Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, China- Japan, art. 3.1, Aug. 27, 1988, 1555 U.N.T.S. 197 (“The
treatment accorded by either Contracting Party within its territory to nationals
and companies of the either Contracting Party with respect to investments,
returns and business activities in connection with the investments shall not be
less favorable than that accorded to nationals and companies of any third
state”).
239
Agreement on Mutual Protection of Investment, China-Swed., art. 2.2,
Mar. 29, 1982, 1350 U.N.T.S. 247.
240
China-Peru BIT, supra note 12, art.3.
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application of the MFN clause to substantive protections has not been
contested, its extension to procedural rights, such as access to
international arbitration, has been debated and was one of the issues
before the Tza tribunal. Mr. Tza sought to avoid the limited scope of
the dispute resolution clause under the Peru-Chinese BIT by
incorporating in reliance to the above MFN clause the more favorable
dispute resolution clause in the third party treaty, the Peru-Columbia
BIT (which allowed arbitration over any disputes).
The core of the developing case law, to which Tza brought its
contribution, is the extent to which an investor may use the MFN clause
of the basic treaty to incorporate the more favorable procedural
protection of a third party BIT to improve its procedural treatment. 241 In
connection with procedural rights, MFN treatment has been granted by
arbitral tribunals to circumvent procedural requirements of the basic
treaty such as the observance of a cooling off period 242 or the
exhaustion of local remedies.243 The great leap forward consisted for
foreign investors in seeking the use of MFN clauses in order to gain
access to international arbitration, when the basic treaty provided for
ad-hoc arbitration only or included a limited consent clause.
Ten years ago, when China was renegotiating its older form BITs
(in particular the new Netherlands and German BITs) the question
arose among commentators on the use of the MFN clauses to
incorporate better dispute resolution clauses in order to circumvent the

241

See DUGAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 413-25; Schreuer, Consent to
Arbitration, supra note 81, at 851-61;Yas Banifatemi, The Emerging
Jurisprudence on the Most Favored Nation Treatment in Investment
Arbitration, INVESTEMENT TREATY LAW: CURRENT ISSUES III,
REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, EMERGING
JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (British
Institute of International and Comparative Law ed., 2009) (R 15.5.1); Claire
Crepet Daigremont, L’Extension Jurisprudentielle de la Competence des
Tribunaux Arbitraux, LESASPECTS NOUVEAUX DU DROIT DES
INVESTISSEMENTS INTERNATIONAUX (2007)(R. 15.5.1); Julie A.
Maupin, MFN-Based Jurisdiction in Investor-State Arbitration: Is There Any
Hope for a Consistent Approach?, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 157, 157-90 (2011).
242
Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICISD Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, ¶
21 (Nov. 13, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 419 (2002) (R. 21.6). See LOWENFELD,
supra note 2, at 572-77; BANIFATEMI, supra note 241.
243
See Siemens v. Republic of Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8,
Decision on Jurisdiction (Aug. 3, 2004) (the scope of the MFN limits’ to
“treatment” and “activities” in the basic BIT was sufficiently wide to include
settlement of disputes (i.e. circumvent waiting periods)).
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narrow consent clauses imposed by China. 244 As noted above, oddly
enough, the first time this mechanism was tested before arbitrators was
the Tza case, for the benefit of a Chinese investment abroad. The use of
the MFN clause in Tza will be examined in light of the solutions found
in four other awards before which the issue was also raised:
Berschader, Rosinvest, Renta4 and Austrian Airlines tribunals. The
applicability of the MFN clause to procedural rights depends first on its
scope and second on its interaction with the consent clause.

1.

SCOPE OF THE MFN CLAUSE

Access to international arbitration by use of the MFN clause
initially resides in the interpretation of the scope of the MFN clause in
the basic treaty. Authors differentiate between clauses that cover
“matters” or “treatments” under the BIT, or if the MFN protection is
granted to investments or to investors. 245 In Berschader, RosInvest and
Austria Airline, the MFN clauses were broad, while in Tza and Renta4,
the MFN protection was limited to the fair and equitable treatment.
Therefore, in Tza and Renta4, the issue was whether the right to
international arbitration is within the ambit of FET. The diversity of
answers by tribunals based on their quite separate interpretations of
similar language does not allow a definitive answer to predict the
outcome of future disputes on this important issue. Some authors speak
of ‘incoherent decisions.’ For instance, in Plama Consortium v.
Bulgaria, where the investor claimed access to ICSID arbitration in lieu
of ad-hoc arbitration specified in the basic treaty, the arbitral tribunal
held that the MFN protection covering “all matters” did not create
access to ICSID arbitration.246 It concluded the MFN clause of the
basic treaty must explicitly refer to investor-state dispute settlement. In
contrast, in Siemens v Argentina, which dealt with a MFN clause
limited to FET, the tribunal held that such MFM protection allowed the

244

See Turner, supra note 101, at 233-58 (R.15.5.1, R 4); Heymann,
supra note 64, at 507-26(R4); Rooney, supra note 66, at 707; Schill, supra note
102, at 73-118; Aaron Chandler, BIT’s, MFN Treatment and the PRC: The
Impact of China’s Ever Evolving Bilateral Investment Treaty Practice, 43
INT’L LAW 1301, 1301-10 (2009)(R 16.4); Mark A. Cymrot, Investment
Disputes with China, 61(3) DISP.RESOL J. 80, 80-7 (2006) (R 16.4).
245
LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 572.
246
See Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/24. Decision on Jurisdiction, (Feb. 8, 2005), 44 ILM 721 (2005).
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investor to circumvent a pre-arbitration cooling period by reference to a
third party treaty without that requirement.247
As to the extension of the scope of the consent clause to create
jurisdiction, the issue has been examined with respect to broad FMN
clauses as well as narrow ones.
The Rosinvest tribunal had to examine a MFN clause covering both
the treatment of “investments and returns” as well as “investors of the
other Contracting Party, as regards their management, maintenance,
use, enjoyment or disposal of their investors.” 248 The tribunal
distinguished between these two wordings and held that the former one
did not include the protection by an arbitration clause covering
expropriation:
[I]t is difficult to doubt that, first, an expropriation is
indeed a ‘treatment’ of the investment by the Host
State. However, secondly, while the protection by an
arbitration clause covering expropriation is a highly
relevant aspect of that ‘treatment,’ if compared with
the alternative that the expropriation of an investment
can only be challenged before the national courts of
the Host State, it does not directly affect the
‘investment,’ but rather the procedural rights of the
‘investor’ for whom paragraph (2) of Article 3
provides a separate rule.249
The latter wording, which granted the MFN protection to investors’
included, according to the Rosinvest tribunal, recourse to arbitration.
While expropriation may interfere with an investors “use” and
“enjoyment,” the ability to submit to arbitration becomes a critical part
of the investors corresponding protection. This allows the investor
significant protection compared with the mere option of challenging the
interference in the domestic courts of the host nation. 250
In Tza, the Chinese investor sought to have recourse by the MFN
clause of the Peru China BIT to the dispute resolution clause provided
for in a third party treaty, namely the Peru-Columbian 2001 BIT which

247

See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction.
UK-Soviet BIT, art. 3(1) & (2).
249
RosInvest Co. UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation (RosInvest), Arb. Inst.
Of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award on Jurisdiction, Case No. V
079/2005, ¶ 127 (Oct. 2007).
250
Id. ¶ 130.
248
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covered “all legal disputes,”251 to broaden the scope of the jurisdiction
of the arbitral tribunal. The MFN Clause in the China-Peru BIT was
limited to FET and provided:
1. Investments and activities associated with
investments of investors of either Contracting Party
shall be accorded fair and equitable treatment and
shall enjoy protection in the territory of the other
Contracting Party.
2. The treatment and protection referred to in para. 1
of this article shall not be less favorable than that
accorded to investments and activities associated
with such investment of investors of a third state. 252
The Tza tribunal interpreted this MFN clause under Article 31 of
the VCLT, “in accordance with its ordinary meaning and having
considered it in the light of the purpose of the BIT, it does not seem to
restrict the scope of the word ‘treatment’ to such significant
commercial matters as exploitation and investment management.” 253
The tribunal accepted that this wording covered access to international
arbitration for violation of the fair and equitable treatment. 254 They did
not agree that it extended to disputes over expropriation.
The Renta4 tribunal took the view that “treatment encompasses
arbitration regardless of whether it relates to investments or investors”
but, by a majority decision, found that the circumstance of that case did
not allow the application of the MFN clause to enlarge the consent

251
Agreement on Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Peru-Colom., art. 12.1, 12.2, Apr. 26 1994, 2342 U.N.T.S. 181 (provided that
any legal dispute between a Contracting Party and a national or company of the
other Contracting Party in connection with the investments under this
Agreement shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably between the parties to
the dispute. If a dispute cannot be settled amicably between the parties to the
dispute within three months from the date of written notice of the claim, the
dispute may be submitted either to the competent court of the Contracting Party
in whose the investment is located or to the international arbitration of the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter referred
to as the “Centre”).
252
Peru-China BIT, supra note 12, at art.3.
253
Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 213 (Feb. 12, 2007).
254
Id.
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clause.255 As in Tza, the MFN clause in the Spanish-Russian BIT was
found to apply to FET only, but the tribunal found that FET did not
extend to international arbitration as opposed to domestic courts. 256
The question subsequently arose in Austrian Airlines where the
applicable MFN of the basic treaty covered investors and “their
investments treatment.”257 The Tribunal took the general view, in line
with Maffezini and RosInvest and Renta4, that as a matter of principle
MFN clauses may apply to dispute settlement clauses:
As a general matter, the tribunal observes that it sees
no conceptual reason why an MFN clause should be
limited to substantive guaranties and rule out
procedural protections, the latter being a means to
enforce the former. The tribunal notes, in this
connection, that the potential application of an MFN
clause to procedural protections is widely accepted
by investment tribunals. This view has been held
mostly with respect to the avoidance of procedural
requirements prior to commence arbitration, but also,
more recently, with respect to the import of a dispute
settlement clause.258

2.

INTERACTION OF THE MFN CLAUSE WITH THE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION CLAUSE

Thus it appears that while recent decisions have acknowledged the
principle that a MFN clause may extend to jurisdiction matters (Tza and
Austrian Airlines), they nonetheless have refused its enforcement when
interpreting this clause in the context of the wording of the dispute
resolution clause.
255

Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, Arb Inst. of Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, Award on Preliminary Objections, Case No. V
024/2007, ¶ 101 (Mar. 20, 2009).
256
Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Spain-Russ, art. 5, Oct. 26, 1990, 1662 U.N.T.S. 199 (“(1)
Treatment of Investments” provided “each party shall guarantee fair and
equitable treatment within its territory for the investments made by investors of
the other Party. (2) The treatment and protection referred to in paragraph 1
above shall be not less favorable than that accorded by either Party to
investments made its territory to investors of any third State”)).
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Austrian-Slovak BIT, art. 3.
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Austrian Airlines v. Slovak Republic (Austrian Airlines),
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 124 (Oct. 9, 2009).
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In Tza, the tribunal considered interpretation of the “general
wording” of the MFN clause contrasted with the “specific wording” of
the consent provision under Article 8(3) of the same BIT where the
parties had “specifically established the possibility of submitting ‘other
matters’ to ICSID arbitration” and “established specifically such
occurrence in the wording of the BIT,” the clause prevented the
incorporation of the more favorable clause found in the third party
treaty.259 When referring to its “duty to give the BIT wording the
meaning it was really intended,” the Tza tribunal held, “the specific
wording of Article 8(3) should prevail over the general wording of the
MFN clause in Article 3.5.”260
A similar approach was adopted by the Austrian Airlines tribunal,
which held that the specific intent of a narrow consent prevailed over
the unspecific intent in the MFN clause:
Faced with a manifest, specific intent to restrict
arbitration to disputes over the amount of
compensation doe expropriation to the exclusion of
disputes over the principles of expropriation, it would
be paradoxical to invalidate that specific intent by
virtue of the general, unspecified intent expressed in
the MFN clause…. The restrictive dispute settlement
mechanism for expropriation claims set out in
Articles 8, 4(4) and 4(5) constitutes an exception to
the scope of Article 3(1). Hence, the MFN clause
does not apply to the settlement of disputes over the
legality of expropriations.261
A different view was adopted in RosInvest, where the tribunal
found that the limitations to the mechanism of the MFN clause were
not to be found in the restrictive wording of the dispute resolution
clause, but instead in the exceptions to the MFN clause listed in that
259

Peru-China BIT, supra note 12, at art.8.3 (“If a dispute involving the
amount of compensation for expropriation cannot be settled within six months
after resort to negotiations….[I]t may be submitted at the request of either party
to the international arbitration of […] ICSID. Any disputes concerning other
matters between an investor of either Contracting Party and the other
Contracting Party may be submitted to the Centre if the parties to the dispute so
agree.” (emphasis added)).
260
Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶ 216 (Feb. 12, 2007).
261
Austrian Airlines v. Slovak Republic (Austrian Airlines),
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 135 (Oct. 9, 2009).
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very clause. The tribunal found the MFN clause applied to the dispute
resolution clause.262
This view should be preferred to the dichotomy adopted in Tza and
Austrian Airlines between specific and general consent wording. It is
the wording of the MFN clause, which should contain its own
limitations and exceptions. Thus the preferred view should be to limit
the scope of the MFN clause (i) in view of its wording and whether
FET would encompass access to international arbitration, and (ii) in
view of its own exceptions listed in that clause.

IV. CONCLUSION
Future disputes involving China BITs are subject to uncertainty in
outcome on the two major issues decided in Tza: (i) the scope of the
consent clause in disputes over expropriation and (ii) the application of
the MFN clauses on older generation BITs when the investor seeks the
broader or more favorable procedural treatment of newer generation
BITs.

262
RosInvest Co. UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation (RosInvest), Arb. Inst.
Of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award on Jurisdiction, Case No. V
079/2005, ¶ 135 (Oct. 2007). “In view of the careful drafting of Article 8
[dispute resolution clause] and the limiting language therein, it can certainly not
be presumed that the Parties “forgot” arbitration when drafting and agreeing on
Article 7 [MFN clause]. Had the Parties intended that the MFN-clauses should
also not apply to arbitration, it would indeed have been easy to add a subsection (c) [exceptions] to that effect in Article 7. The fact that this was not
done, in the view of the Tribunal, is further confirmation that the MFN-clauses
in Article 3 are also applicable to submissions to arbitration in other Treaties.”

